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The Bush Administration’s Terrorist
Surveillance Program and the Fourth
Amendment’s Warrant Requirement:
Lessons from Justice Powell and the
Keith Case
Tracey Maclin∗
This Article analyzes the Bush Administration’s claim that the President
has the authority to order warrantless electronic surveillance of
communications between American citizens and persons abroad suspected
of having connections with foreign terrorists groups. The Article begins by
focusing on United States v. United States District Court, also known as
Keith. The Keith ruling held that the President did not have the power to
authorize warrantless wiretaps in national security cases.
The Keith case merits our attention today for several reasons. The
result in Keith stunned the press and public. Equally remarkable was the
fact that no Justice voted to uphold the government’s claim that
warrantless wiretaps in national security cases were reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.
Another important aspect about Keith is that it not only rejected
President Richard Nixon’s claim that he could authorize warrantless
wiretaps, but it did so in a manner that unmistakably embraced the
warrant requirement, a core precept of the Warren Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
Finally, understanding the scope and rationale of Keith is important
today because its logic is equally applicable to the Bush Administration’s
claim that it has the power to monitor telephone and email
communications between American citizens and persons suspected of
having connections with foreign terrorist organizations. When evaluating
*
Joseph Lipsitt Faculty Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston
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this claim, it is instructive to recall how the Keith Court responded to
President Nixon’s similar claim that he had the power to authorize
warrantless wiretaps in domestic security scenarios: the Court rejected it.
What Keith said about the President’s authority in domestic security
cases applies equally to warrantless electronic surveillance inside the
nation’s borders of American citizens whom the government suspects have
ties to terrorist groups. In fact, there is no principled, constitutional
difference between the Keith case and what the Bush Administration has
done with the Terrorist Surveillance Program.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2007 UC Davis Law Review symposium analyzed Katz v. United
States1 and its impact on Fourth Amendment law forty years after that
decision. Indeed, the subtitle of the symposium, “From Warrantless
Wiretaps to the War on Terror,” subtly recognized that some of the
concerns and questions surrounding electronic surveillance forty years
ago — What is the constitutional status of wiretapping? Is the
purpose behind the wiretap relevant to the constitutional inquiry?
Does the Constitution prohibit all forms of wiretapping? If the
Constitution does not bar wiretapping, how much discretion should
government officials have to employ wiretapping or bugging? If
government officials have good cause to wiretap, is that enough to
satisfy constitutional concerns? Must government officials receive
judicial approval before conducting wiretapping? And do Fourth
Amendment safeguards control the President’s power to employ
wiretapping? — are still being discussed and debated today as the
nation decides how much privacy is appropriate during a war on
foreign terrorism.
Katz answered most of these questions, for a while, anyway, when it
held that wiretapping was subject to constitutional scrutiny and stated
that warrants could issue to authorize electronic surveillance. The
ruling in Katz has come to mean many things to many people. When
it was first decided, Katz was described as a “seminal” and “landmark
decision,” whose importance could not be overstated.2 A few years
later, Professor Anthony Amsterdam, in his classic article on the
Fourth Amendment, wrote that Katz represented a value judgment
about what the Fourth Amendment meant to a free society.3 However,
with the ascendancy of the conservative Burger and Rehnquist Courts,
the holding in Katz became less significant, if not inconsequential.
Professor David Sklansky, the most perceptive modern interpreter of
Katz and someone who has described Katz as “perhaps the most

1

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.1, at 228 (1978) (noting that “it is no overstatement to say, as the
commentators have asserted, that Katz ‘marks a watershed in fourth amendment
jurisprudence’ because the Court ‘purported to clean house on outmoded fourth
amendment principles’ and moved ‘toward a redefinition of the scope of the Fourth
Amendment’” (footnotes omitted)).
3
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 403 (1974).
2
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influential search-and-seizure decision of the past half-century,”4
acknowledges that “[a]mong scholars Katz is widely viewed as
something of a failure.”5 On Katz’s legacy, Sklansky writes that when
one looks beyond the topic of electronic surveillance, Katz has not
expanded the scope of the Fourth Amendment beyond the “trespass
test”6 announced in Olmstead v. United States.7 Thus, the impact of
Katz “has seemed to make little practical difference.”8
4

David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS.
L.J. 143, 145 (2002) [hereinafter Sklansky, Back to the Future]. Additional analysis of
Katz by Sklansky appears in David A. Sklansky, Katz v. United States: The Limits of
Aphorism, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 223 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) [hereinafter
Sklansky, The Limits of Aphorism].
5
David A. Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the
Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure, 41 UC DAVIS L. REV. 875, 883 (2008). As
Sklansky and others know, Katz has not engendered much respect from some of the
Justices either. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (describing Katz as “self-indulgent” test). For example, Justice Antonin
Scalia has remarked that “the only thing the past three decades have established about
the Katz test (which has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan’s separate
concurrence in Katz) is that, unsurprisingly, those ‘actual (subjective) expectation[s]
of privacy’ ‘that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable,”’ bear an uncanny
resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.”
Id.; see also, Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60-61
(2001) (observing test for privacy is circular, “for someone can have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in an area if and only if the Court has held that a search in that
area would be unreasonable”); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801,
808 (2004) (noting that reasonable expectation of privacy test “is largely circular: a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy when the courts decide to protect it
through the Fourth Amendment”).
6
Sklansky, supra note 5, at 885.
7
277 U.S. 438, 456-57 (1928). According to Sklansky, the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have repeatedly “read the Fourth Amendment to provide protections that are
place-specific. Inside the home, the Fourth Amendment applies with special force;
outside the home — in cars, on highways, in fields, in offices, and even in
backyards — Fourth Amendment protection drops off dramatically. And even in the
home, surveillance rarely rises to the level of a search unless it involves, if not
technically a trespass, at least a physical intrusion.” Sklansky, supra note 5, at 885
(footnotes omitted).
8
Sklansky, supra note 5, at 885 (appears on page 8 of “04 2nd Edit to Author”);
see also Kerr, supra note 5, at 807 (“The Katz ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test
has proven more a revolution on paper than in practice; Katz has had a surprisingly
limited effect on the largely property-based contours of traditional Fourth
Amendment law.”); Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV.
904, 904, 910 (2004) (arguing “that the demise of Katz has actually been
understated,” and that under “the case law and emerging facts, there is a surprisingly
strong case for believing that Katz . . . [is] no longer good law even for the contents of
telephone calls”).
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Although I agree with Sklansky’s description of Katz’s long-term
impact on the scope of search and seizure doctrine, my discussion will
focus on a ruling that could be characterized as a more
constitutionally robust and stronger version of Katz. That ruling is
United States v. United States District Court, also known as Keith.9
Although it involved “facts far more dramatic than those in Katz,”10
Keith ruled that the President violated the Fourth Amendment by
authorizing warrantless wiretaps in national security cases. Today, in
light of the War on Terror and the Bush Administration’s claim of
inherent authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance of
communications between American citizens and persons suspected of
having connections with foreign terrorist groups, Keith may be a more
pertinent and significant case than Katz.
The background and ruling in Keith merit our attention today for
several reasons. First, what is remarkable about Keith, at least in
retrospect, is not just the result which, at the time, the press and
public saw as “stunning,”11 but also the fact no Justice voted to uphold
the government’s claim that warrantless wiretaps in national security
cases were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Like its
predecessors, the Nixon Administration claimed authority to wiretap

9

407 U.S. 297 (1972). The title Keith is taken from the name of then-United
States District Court Judge Damon Keith. Interestingly, Judge Keith was not the
original judge in the case. “The case was originally assigned to United [States] District
Court Judge Talbot Smith, but was randomly reassigned to Judge Keith when Smith
recused himself for personal reasons.” Samuel C. Damren, The Keith Case, CT.
LEGACY (Hist’l Soc’y for the U.S. Dist. Court for the E.D. Mich.), Nov. 2003, at 2.
Judge Keith initially rejected the government’s claim that the President had the
inherent authority to authorize warrantless wiretaps in national security cases. The
government’s claim was a response to a defense motion in a criminal case that the
government divulge all records of electronic surveillance directed at the defendants or
unindicted co-conspirators. See United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1075-76,
1079-80 (E.D. Mich. 1971). After Judge Keith rejected the government’s claim, he
ordered the government to disclose any electronic surveillance directed at the
defendants. The government then filed a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit to compel Judge Keith to vacate his order directing the
government to disclose to defendant Lawrence Robert “Pun” Plamondon
conversations of his overheard by the government. The Court of Appeals denied the
petition. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 444 F.2d 651, 652, 667, 669
(6th Cir. 1971).
10
Sklansky, The Limits of Aphorism, supra note 4, at 250.
11
Fred P. Graham, High Court Curbs U.S. Wiretapping Aimed at Radicals, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 1972, at 1 (Special Insert); see also Glen Elsasser, Court Rules Wiretaps
Need OK, CHI. TRIB., June 20, 1972, at 1A-11; John P. MacKenzie, Court Curbs
Wiretapping of Radicals, WASH. POST, June 20, 1972, at A1; The Supreme Court:
Untapped, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1972, at 17, 17.
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in domestic security cases without judicial approval. When Keith
came to the Court, President Richard Nixon had appointed four new
Justices considered to be law-and-order conservatives sympathetic to
the President’s position on wiretapping. In fact, one of those new
appointees, Lewis F. Powell Jr., had written a controversial op-ed
article supporting wiretapping in national security cases a few months
before Keith was decided.12 Moreover, Justice Byron White, a holdover
from the Warren Court, had already gone on record in Katz as saying
warrantless wiretaps in domestic security cases were reasonable if
authorized by the President or the Attorney General. Thus, the Nixon
Administration could not be faulted for being somewhat sanguine
about its chances of success in Keith.13 Despite this background, eight
Justices voted against the government.14
As Justice Powell’s biographer, John Jeffries, Jr., has noted, Powell
was intimately involved with the issue of electronic surveillance in
national security cases shortly before Keith was decided.15 Therefore, it
was fitting that Powell would weigh-in on the result in Keith. But
based on what the public knew about Justice Powell’s views on
wiretapping in national security cases, the fact that Justice Powell wrote
the opinion rejecting the President’s claim was just as astonishing, if
not more so, than the ultimate result reached in the case.
A second important aspect about Keith is that it not only reaffirmed
Katz and extended its holding to national security cases, it did so in a
manner that unmistakably embraced the warrant requirement, a core

12
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Op-Ed., Civil Liberties Repression: Fact or Fiction? — “LawAbiding Citizens Have Nothing to Fear,” RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 1, 1971,
reprinted in Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings
before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 213-17 (1971).
13
Cf. The Law, “New Curb on Bugging,” TIME, July 3, 1972, at 30, 30 (noting that
when Keith reached Court, “the Government thought its chances of enforcing [its]
claim seemed promising”).
14
Five Justices joined Justice Powell’s opinion declaring that the President lacked
the authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance. Chief Justice Warren
Burger concurred in the result. Justice White concurred in the judgment. Without
deciding the constitutional issue, Justice White concluded that the challenged
electronic surveillance in Keith violated Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968. Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the case, presumably
because he had worked on the wiretap issue when he served as head of the Office of
Legal Counsel in the Nixon Justice Department and it was publicly stated that he
supported the government’s position. See Remaking the Supreme Court: Nixon Sets a
Pattern, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 1, 1971, at 15, 17 (stating that “Rehnquist has
defended the Government’s right to employ electronic surveillance against political
extremists without prior court approval”).
15
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 376 (1994).
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precept of the Warren Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Since the early part of the twentieth century, the legitimacy of the
warrant requirement — the rule that police obtain a judge’s warrant
before commencing a search and seizure — was a topic of debate
among the Justices. By the mid-1960s, however, the Warren Court
settled the debate in favor of the rule. Thus, in Katz, Justice Potter
Stewart confidently wrote for the majority that “searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment —
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.”16
In Keith, although the government, once again, sought to reopen the
debate over the warrant requirement’s validity, the Court was
uninterested. Brushing aside the government’s argument that the
Fourth Amendment does not require warrants, but merely that
searches be “reasonable,” Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court
unapologetically embraced the warrant requirement as “the very heart
of the Fourth Amendment directive.”17 Unlike the initial Fourth
Amendment opinion authored by another Nixon appointee a few
months prior to Keith,18 Justice Powell’s opinion was free of the factspecific, totality-of-the-circumstances balancing often seen in search
and seizure rulings then and now. To the contrary, Justice Powell’s
reasoning was succinct and categorical: The warrant requirement
applied to national security wiretaps and there was no basis for
exempting the President from the requirement. There was no nuance
and no room for manipulation by the government. Significantly, no
Justice filed a dissent to Powell’s holding or criticized his reasoning.19
16

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972).
18
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), was Justice Blackmun’s first opinion as a
Justice. See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 56 (2005). Wyman concerned the constitutionality of a New
York statute that required welfare applicants to allow state officials to visit their homes
as a condition of receiving welfare benefits. Justice Harry Blackmun’s opinion
upholding the statute was a fact-specific ruling that eschewed any per se rules
regarding Fourth Amendment principles. When Wyman was decided, “most of the
commentators viewed the decision as proof that Justice Blackmun would be the
conservative law-and-order justice that Nixon had sought.” Id. at 62. Of course,
Justice Blackmun would later be characterized in the popular press as a “liberal”
Justice primarily because of his position on abortion. Interestingly, and despite his
reputation as a “liberal,” Justice Blackmun later stated he “‘never regretted [his] vote
in [Wyman] and would vote the same way again.’” Id. at 63.
19
According to one source, after it became clear that Justice Powell would write
an opinion strongly rejecting the President’s position, Chief Justice Burger tried to
17
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Justice Powell’s recognition of the warrant requirement is significant
because, before his appointment to the Court, Powell was thought to be
a strong critic of the Warren Court’s approach to deciding constitutional
criminal procedure issues. For example, before coming to the Court,
Justice Powell openly questioned the wisdom of Mapp v. Ohio,20 which
extended the federal rule requiring the exclusion of evidence obtained
in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights to state criminal
proceedings. And he harshly criticized Miranda v. Arizona,21 which
ruled that suspects must be warned of their right to remain silent and
have counsel present before being subjected to custodial police
interrogation. Critics of the Warren Court saw the warrant requirement
in the same light as the exclusionary rule and Miranda warnings,
namely as illegitimate, extra-judicial law-making with no support in the
text or history of the Constitution.22 Whatever he might have thought
of the warrant requirement before Keith or after it,23 Justice Powell’s

assign the case to Justice White, “who, along with [Burger], wanted to duck the
central constitutional question of whether the warrantless wiretap violated the Fourth
Amendment.” BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT 223 (1979). Justice White, however, declined the assignment.
Because Justice William Douglas was the senior Justice of the majority, he reassigned
the case to Justice Powell “who held firm in the face of Burger’s continuous pressure
not to write a broad constitutional ruling.” Id.
20
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
21
384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
22
See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41
(1969) (“[O]ur constitutional fathers were not concerned about warrantless searches,
but about overreaching warrants. It is perhaps too much to say that they feared the
warrant more than the search, but it is plain enough that the warrant was the prime
object of their concern. Far from looking at the warrant as a protection against
unreasonable searches, they saw it as an authority for unreasonable and oppressive
searches . . . .”); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757, 761-81 (1994) (criticizing warrant requirement from historical, textual, and
practical perspective).
23
See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 429-36 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (adhering to result in Arkansas v. Sanders, but expressing concern that
plurality’s ruling applies warrant requirement in mechanical fashion to any item taken
from car); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (noting that Warrant Clause of Fourth Amendment does not apply to
investigative detention); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979) (affirming that
search of private property must be pursuant to properly issued search warrant issued
in compliance with Warrant Clause); id. at 766 (holding that warrant requirement
applies to personal luggage taken from automobile to same degree it applies to such
luggage in other locations); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545
(1976) (holding that “the operation of a fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in
advance by a judicial warrant”); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 384 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring) (concluding that routine inventory searches of impounded
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opinion in Keith made clear that the warrant requirement applied to the
President even in situations where Executive Branch officials believed
that the nation’s security was at risk.
Finally, understanding the scope and rationale of Keith is important
today because its logic is equally applicable to the Bush
Administration’s claim that it has the power to monitor telephone and
email communications between American citizens and persons
suspected of having connections with foreign terrorist organizations.
The Bush Administration insists that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement does not apply to the Terrorist Surveillance Program
(“TSP”) conducted by the National Security Agency (“NSA”) for at
least two reasons. First, the President has the inherent authority,
notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment, to conduct electronic
surveillance of foreign powers.24 Second, the surveillance conducted
by the NSA is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.25 When
evaluating the former claim, it is instructive to recall how the Keith
Court responded to President Nixon’s similar claim that he had the
power to authorize warrantless wiretaps in domestic security
scenarios: the Court rejected it.
Keith explained that “Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly
be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted
solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch.”26 The Court
pointedly noted that the Amendment “does not contemplate the
executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested
magistrates,”27 and stated that the President and his aides “should not
be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means
automobiles do not require warrants); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 427-32
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that “historical and policy reasons” justify
officer’s “warrantless arrest in a public place even though he had adequate opportunity
to procure a warrant”); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 282-84
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (finding that warrant is required for roving automobile
searches in border areas).
24
Brief of Appellants at 34, ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 062095 & 06-2140); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 6-10 (2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf. For a
slightly different defense of the constitutionality of the TSP by a former official in the
Bush Administration, see John Yoo, The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the
Constitution, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 565, 566 (2007) (arguing that TSP “represents a
valid exercise of the President’s Commander-in-Chief authority to gather intelligence
during wartime”).
25
Brief of Appellants, supra note 24, at 36.
26
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1972).
27
Id. at 317.
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in pursuing their tasks.”28 Keith emphasized that its rejection of the
President’s claim did not come from some new-fangled interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment and was not inconsistent with the Court’s
historic role in our constitutional system. Rather, Keith relied upon
traditional notions of separation of powers when it explained that the
warrant requirement is the “time-tested means”29 protecting Fourth
Amendment rights. For a search to be reasonable, according to Keith,
the Amendment requires “a prior judicial judgment, not the risk that
executive discretion may be reasonably exercised.”30 Prior judicial
approval is consistent with “our basic constitutional doctrine that
individual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation of
powers and division of functions among the different branches and
levels of Government.”31 What Keith said about the President’s
authority in domestic security cases equally applies to warrantless
electronic surveillance inside the nation’s borders of American citizens
whom the government suspects have ties to terrorist groups. In fact,
there is no principled, constitutional difference between the Keith case
and what the Bush Administration has done with the TSP.32
My discussion of Keith and its relevance to the TSP proceeds as
follows. Part I highlights what the public knew about Lewis Powell’s
views on wiretapping before he became a member of the Court. Part
II focuses on Justice Powell’s opinion in Keith. While the result in
Keith stunned the public, and may have surprised even the Nixon
Administration, the opinion itself was noteworthy for a different, and
more important, reason. Finally, Part III considers whether the TSP,
as originally implemented, is constitutional.
As a matter of legal principle, everyone seems to agree that “the
Constitution is above the Congress, and the President.”33 The

28

Id.
Id. at 318.
30
Id. at 317.
31
Id. (citation omitted).
32
Cf. Russo v. Byrne, 409 U.S. 1219, 1219 (1972) (writing for court, Circuit Judge
Douglas stated: “It is argued that [Keith] involved ‘domestic’ surveillance, but the
Fourth Amendment and our prior decisions, to date at least, draw no distinction
between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ surveillance”); John Cary Sims, What NSA Is Doing . . .
and Why It’s Illegal, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105, 110 (2006) (asserting that “Keith’s
recital of the threat to personal liberties posed by allowing surveillance to be put in
place on the basis of ‘unreviewed executive discretion’ seemed to be as applicable to
foreign intelligence wiretaps as to those directed at domestic security threats”
(footnote omitted)).
33
Yoo, supra note 24, at 597. I disagree with Professor John Yoo’s statement that
“[c]laims that the NSA program violates the Constitution appeal not to a concern
29
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penultimate question here is whether the President has the inherent
power to authorize foreign intelligence searches, without judicial
approval, of the communications of American citizens and lawful
residents that occur inside the nation. The Bush Administration and
its supporters contend that the President has that power,
notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment.
Alternatively, the
government contends the TSP fits within the special needs exception
to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Part III concludes
that each of the government’s arguments is incompatible with Fourth
Amendment law and the meaning of Keith.
I.

LEWIS POWELL AND WIRETAPPING: THE MAN THE COUNTRY KNEW

Lewis Powell gained national prominence when he became the
president of the American Bar Association in August of 1964.
“Becoming president of the ABA put Powell on the national map,”34
and provided him a “bully pulpit” to air his views on a variety of legal
subjects.35 Although Powell had never prosecuted or acted as defense
counsel in a criminal case, as ABA president, “[m]ostly, he talked
about crime.”36 Indeed, Powell’s speeches and writings would earn
him a reputation as a law-and-order advocate and critic of the Warren
Court’s constitutional criminal procedure rulings.
Eventually,
Powell’s name would be repeatedly mentioned when President Nixon
was looking to fill vacancies on the Court with individuals who shared
his judicial “philosophy,” which meant taking strong positions about
“crime in the streets” and opposing Warren Court rulings upholding
the rights of criminal suspects.37
about law, but rather to a concern about politics.” Id. at 601. Certainly the arguments
proffered here (and the arguments made by other critics of the TSP) are based on
genuine concern over whether the President’s authorization of the TSP is consistent
with constitutional principle. See, e.g., David Cole, Reviving the Nixon Doctrine: NSA
Spying, the Commander-in-Chief, and Executive Power in the War on Terror, 13 WASH. &
LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 17, 18 (2006) (stating that Bush Administration’s position on
TSP is “emblematic of its approach to the war on terror,” and arguing that
Administration “has taken overly aggressive positions that unnecessarily run
roughshod over fundamental principles of the rule of law”).
34
JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at 194.
35
Id. at 210.
36
Id.
37
See id. at 214 (noting that because of Powell’s reputation as critic of Warren
Court, “[w]hen the administration of Richard Nixon looked for potential Supreme
Court nominees, Powell’s name naturally made the list”); see also JOHN W. DEAN, THE
REHNQUIST CHOICE 16 (2001) (describing Powell as contender for Supreme Court seat
because of his “philosophy,” which was suggested by his criticism of Warren Court
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As president of the ABA, on June 26, 1965, Powell delivered a
“widely publicized”38 address at the Fourth Circuit Judicial
Conference entitled State of Criminal Justice,39 in which he asserted
that “[t]he strengthening and clarifying of criminal laws and the
improvement in the administration of criminal justice, especially in its
certainty and swiftness, will help restore the state of law and order
which is so urgently needed.”40 In that speech, Powell expressed
frustration with several recent Supreme Court decisions which, he
charged, “significantly complicated the task of law enforcement.”41
On July 26, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson established the
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice
(“Commission”) to investigate the causes of crime, the existing system
of criminal procedure, and to recommend appropriate legislation.42
Doubtlessly due to Powell’s growing reputation “as a tough but fairminded proponent of public order,”43 President Johnson wanted
Powell to chair the Commission. While Powell turned down the
assignment as chair, he nevertheless agreed to serve on the
Commission.44 Two years later, the Commission issued a detailed
report entitled The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society.45
On the general topic of electronic surveillance, the Commission
found that the confused state of the law was “intolerable,” and that
contemporaneous legal doctrine “serves the interests neither of

criminal procedure rulings).
38
Isidore Silver, Introduction to PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT &
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 18 (Avon
Books 1968) (1967).
39
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Address at the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference: State of
Criminal Justice (June 26, 1965), reprinted in Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and
Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 258-63
(1971).
40
Id. at 259.
41
Id. at 259 n.3, 260. Some of the rulings Powell mentioned were Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). Powell,
supra note 39, at 259 n.3, 261. In his farewell address as president of the ABA, Powell
continued to talk about crime and court rulings. According to Dean John Jeffries,
Powell told the ABA convention audience that while the rights of criminal suspects
must be protected, the “first priority today must be a like concern for the right of
citizens to be free from criminal molestations of their persons and property.” JEFFRIES,
supra note 15, at 211.
42
Silver, supra note 38, at 18-19.
43
JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at 211.
44
Id. at 212.
45
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 38.
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privacy nor of law enforcement.”46 While all members of the
Commission agreed that the status of the law on wiretapping and
bugging was a mess, they disagreed on how to fix it, the desirability of
a federal wiretap statute, and the threat to privacy that governmental
wiretapping posed. A majority of the Commission’s members,
including Powell, favored the enactment of electronic surveillance
laws consistent with the norms recently announced by the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Berger v. New York.47
The majority also opined that the enactment of wiretap legislation
“would significantly reduce the incentive for, and the incidence of,
improper electronic surveillance.”48
Other members of the
Commission, however, had “serious doubts about the desirability” of
wiretap legislation.49 They believed that “without the kind of
searching inquiry that would result from further congressional
consideration of electronic surveillance,” there is “insufficient basis to
strike th[e] balance against the interests of privacy.”50 Significantly,
there was apparent unanimity on the Commission that “[m]atters
affecting the national security not involving criminal prosecution”
were outside the Commission’s mandate, and that the Commission’s
discussion of wiretapping was not “intended to affect the existing
powers to protect that interest.”51 Powell, however, regretted “the
‘weak and ineffective stance [the Commission was] taking on
electronic surveillance.’”52
Although Powell shared the Commission’s belief that federal wiretap
legislation was needed, he broke from the majority when he wrote a
supplemental statement — “Powell was careful not to call it a
dissent”53 — to the Report criticizing the Warren Court’s recent

46

Id. at 472.
388 U.S. 41, 55-60 (1967) (describing constitutional requirements for
legislation authorizing electronic surveillance). The Court announced that legislation
authorizing electronic surveillance must, first, comply with the Fourth Amendment’s
particularity clause by specifying the crime under investigation and which
conversations are to be seized; second, require independent showings of probable
cause for subsequent intrusions into suspect’s privacy; third, require a termination
date for electronic surveillance once the conversation sought is seized; and fourth,
require a return on the warrant to a judicial officer. Id.
48
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 38, at 473.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at 213.
53
Id. at 214.
47
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rulings in Miranda v. Arizona, Escobedo v. Illinois,54 and Griffin v.
California.55 Powell’s harshest comments were directed at Miranda.
He observed that while the implications of “the code of conduct”
prescribed by Miranda remained unclear, “there can be little doubt
that its effect upon police interrogation and the use of confessions will
drastically change procedures long considered by law enforcement
officials to be indispensable to the effective functioning of our
system.”56 If enforced as written, Powell predicted that Miranda
“could mean the virtual elimination of pretrial interrogation of
suspects — on the street, at the scene of a crime, and in the station
house — because there would then be no such interrogation without
the presence of counsel unless the person detained, howsoever briefly,
waives [his] rights.”57 Finally, Powell advocated amending the
Constitution to correct the “imbalance” created by Miranda.58
Although Powell’s criticism of Miranda did not result in its demise, it
did burnish his reputation “as a critic — a respectful and responsible
but unmistakably conservative critic — of the Warren Court.”59
Even after Powell left the ABA presidency and the President’s Crime
Commission, his name continued to be associated with the topic of
wiretapping and his views became even more controversial. In
February of 1971, the ABA Criminal Justice Committee, on which
Powell served, approved standards for the use of electronic
surveillance.60
Those standards permitted presidential wiretaps
without prior judicial approval in cases involving a foreign power.61

54
378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (holding that where police violate Sixth
Amendment right to counsel by taking suspect into custody for interrogation, denying
suspect’s request to consult with his lawyer, and failing to effectively warn suspect of
his constitutional right to remain silent, none of suspect’s statements during
interrogation may be used against him at criminal trial).
55
380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination
Clause prohibits “either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or
instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt” (footnote omitted));
see PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 38, at 668-81.
56
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 38, at 672.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 679-80.
59
JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at 214.
60
ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 3.1 (Approved Draft 1971).
61
Id. The standards provided:

The use of electronic surveillance techniques by appropriate federal officers
for the overhearing or recording of wire or oral communications to protect
the nation from attack by or other hostile acts of a foreign power or to
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By contrast, in cases involving domestic security issues, the ABA
standards refused to take a position on the President’s power to
employ wiretapping without a court order.62 Powell would later
explain his understanding of the ABA’s wiretap standards during his
Senate confirmation hearings. The ABA standards, Powell testified,
allowed for wiretapping without a prior court order in national
security situations involving a foreign power, but did not address “the
far more troublesome area of internal security surveillance.”63
On April 15, 1971, Powell gave a speech to the Richmond Bar
Association,64 wherein he briefly touched on the “perplexing issue” of
the President’s authority to wiretap in national security cases.65 While
Powell assumed that the President had the power “to take all
appropriate measures to protect the nation against hostile acts of a
foreign power,” he noted that “the President’s authority with respect
to internal security is less clear.”66 Powell then offered a few cryptic
protect military or other national security information against foreign
intelligence activities should be permitted subject to appropriate Presidential
and Congressional standards and supervision.
Id.
62
The commentary to the Approved Draft of standards explained that the
Committee “rejected any reading of the Fourth Amendment that would invariably
require compliance with a court order system before surveillance in the interest of the
national security could be termed constitutionally ‘reasonable.’” Id. § 3.1 cmt. at 12
(Approved Draft Supp. 1971). The commentary also noted that the Committee “was
reluctant to approve any standard that might unduly circumscribe, even indirectly, the
power of the President to protect the national security interest or to suggest that what
is constitutional for the Commander-in-C[h]ief to do under one provision of the
Constitution could somehow be termed constitutionally ‘unreasonable’ under the
Fourth Amendment.” Id.
Interestingly, the commentary to the standards ultimately approved by the
Committee, which gave the President the power to employ warrantless surveillance in
foreign security cases, suggests that the Committee had considered, and denied, giving
the President similar power to use warrantless surveillance in domestic security cases:
“The Committee considered and rejected language which would have recognized a
comparable residuary power in the President not subject to prior judicial review to
deal with purely domestic subversive groups.” Id. § 3.1 cmt. at 121 (Approved Draft
1971). Notwithstanding this comment, the final standards approved by the ABA make
no mention of the President’s power to conduct electronic surveillance in domestic
security cases.
63
Powell, supra note 39, at 207.
64
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Address Before the Richmond Bar Association: Organized
Crime and Electronic Surveillance — In Virginia? (Apr. 15, 1971), reprinted in
Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 244-48 (1971).
65
Id. at 247.
66
Id.
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observations that could be interpreted as suggesting that the
President’s authority to wiretap should not turn on the source of the
threat to the nation. He stated:
There is an obvious potential for grave abuse, and an equally
obvious need where there is a clear and present danger of a
serious internal threat. The distinction between external and
internal threats to the security of our country is far less
meaningful now that radical organizations openly advocate
violence. Freedom can be as irrevocably lost from revolution
as from foreign attack.67
Powell also mentioned that the controversy surrounding wiretapping
was currently before the courts, including the recent Sixth Circuit
ruling denying the President’s claim of inherent authority to conduct
domestic security wiretaps in Keith,68 and that eventually “there may
be a need for clarifying legislation.”69
Less than four months after his Richmond Bar Association speech,
Powell’s most contentious comments on wiretapping were published
in an op-ed column in the Richmond-Times Dispatch.70 The column
was subsequently reprinted in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin and
later in the New York Times71 during Powell’s Senate Confirmation
Hearings. Although the op-ed article was controversial for several
reasons, one significant aspect of the article escaped the attention of
the nation’s press and most of the Senators who later questioned
Powell about his views on wiretapping.
Prior to the publication of the op-ed article on August 1, 1971, Powell
had generally associated himself with the view that court-approved
wiretapping was lawful in criminal cases. He endorsed that position in
1967 when he served on the President’s Commission on Crime. Powell
had also unequivocally opined that the President had the inherent
power to wiretap without judicial approval in situations involving
foreign agents or foreign intelligence matters. He stated that opinion in
his April 15, 1971, Richmond Bar Association speech.72 On whether the

67

Id.
Id. at 247 n.5.
69
Id. at 247.
70
Powell, supra note 12.
71
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Op-Ed., ‘America Is Not a Repressive Society,’ N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 1971, at 47.
72
Powell, supra note 64, at 247 (“I will say in passing that there is little
question — at least there should be none — as to the power of the President to take
all appropriate measures to protect the nation against hostile acts of a foreign
68

2008] The Bush Administration’s Terrorist Surveillance Program

1275

President had inherent authority to wiretap in domestic security cases,
Powell initially seemed to purposefully equivocate. In his Richmond
speech, he said the “President’s authority with respect to internal
security is less clear.”73 But, less than four months later, as a member of
the ABA Criminal Justice Committee, he signed off on standards that
could be interpreted as denying presidential authority to wiretap in
domestic security cases. In the Richmond-Times Dispatch article,
however, Powell “had apparently changed his mind” on this question.74
Speaking generally, and departing from his normally moderate and
cautious tone,75 Powell’s op-ed article asserted that the “outcry against
wiretapping is a tempest in a teapot,” and that “[l]aw-abiding citizens
having nothing to fear” regarding federal electronic surveillance.76 As to
federal wiretaps in foreign and internal security cases, Powell noted that
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 “left this
delicate area to the inherent power of the President.”77 Powell then
observed that critics of wiretapping have “focused on its use in internal
security cases and some courts have distinguished these from foreign
threats.”78 Conceding the potential for abuse, “at least in theory,” when
the President authorizes wiretaps for internal security cases, Powell
retorted that “[t]his possibility must be balanced against the general
public interest in preventing violence (e.g., bombing of the Capitol) and
organized attempts to overthrow the government.”79 Debunking the
myth that the Justice Department was “usurping new power” by

power.”).
73
Id.
74
JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at 376 (“[T]he ABA supported the President’s claim of
unilateral authority to order wiretaps in national security cases but only against
foreign agents. Electronic surveillance in domestic security matters . . . would require
a court order. Powell sat on the ABA committee that approved this requirement, but
by 1971 he had apparently changed his mind.”).
75
See id. at 239 (noting that op-ed article was “an uncharacteristically savage
rebuttal” to critics who claimed America was repressive society and that Powell’s
“usual reserve and moderation gave way to a shrill attack on ‘standard leftist
propaganda’ about violations of civil liberties”).
76
Powell, supra note 12, at 215.
77
Id. at 214.
78
Id. Powell also noted that the issue of the President’s inherent power to wiretap
in domestic security cases was then currently pending before the Court in the Keith
case. Id.
79
Id. Powell’s hypothetical example of a “bombing of the Capitol” may have been
a not-so-subtle reference to Keith, which involved a bombing of the CIA office in Ann
Arbor, Michigan. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 299 (1972).
In his testimony before the Senate, however, Powell claimed that he was not aware of
the facts involved in Keith. See Powell, supra note 39, at 208.
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wiretapping, Powell explained that the “truth is that wiretapping, as the
most effective detection means, has been used against espionage and
subversion for at least three decades under six Presidents.”80
Most significantly, Powell dismissed the argument that the legality of
the President’s inherent power to wiretap should turn on whether the
government was seeking intelligence on foreign or internal security
threats. Such a distinction may have been valid in the past, but now
any distinction between foreign and domestic threats was “largely
meaningless” because the “radical left” at home was “plotting violence
and revolution” with Communist enemies abroad.81 Repeating a line
from his April 15 Richmond Bar Association speech, Powell wrote:
“Freedom can be lost as irrevocably from revolution as from foreign
attack.”82 On this point, Powell was directly contradicting the position
he had taken three months earlier as a member of the ABA’s Criminal
Justice Committee, which had drawn the same distinction between
foreign and internal threats, and had given the President wiretap
authority only in cases involving foreign threats.83 Powell also had a
reply to critics who asked, why, if warrants are required for wiretaps in
criminal cases, should not they also be required in domestic security
cases. Powell endorsed the government’s claim that the need for
secrecy precluded utilization of the warrant process. He suggested that
“leftist radical organizations and their sympathizers in this country”
would cooperate with Communist nations to reveal sensitive
intelligence in domestic security cases.84 “Public disclosure of this
sensitive information would seriously handicap our counter-espionage
and counter-subversive operations.”85
Moving beyond the topic of wiretapping, Powell closed his op-ed
article with more criticism of the Warren Court. He remarked that
recent “dramatic decisions of the Supreme Court have further
strengthened the rights of accused persons and correspondingly
limited the powers of law enforcement,” naming Miranda and Escobedo

80

Powell, supra note 12, at 214.
Id.
82
Id.; see also Powell, supra note 39, at 247.
83
See JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at 376-77 (noting that by 1971, “[t]he fighting issue
was warrantless wiretaps for domestic security”). According to Jeffries, “Powell
admitted [in his Richmond-Times Dispatch article] that ‘some courts’ had distinguished
internal security from foreign threats but did not mention that the ABA committee on
which he sat had drawn precisely that distinction. He now took a different view.” Id.
84
Powell, supra note 12, at 215.
85
Id.
81
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as two examples.86 He subtly suggested that the Court was responsible
for a criminal justice system that “subordinates the safety of society to
the rights of persons accused of crime.”87 Differing with this view,
Powell wrote “[t]he need is for greater protection — not of criminals
but of law-abiding citizens.”88
On October 21, 1971, less than three months after Powell’s
controversial op-ed article, President Nixon surprised the nation with
a television and radio broadcast announcing two unexpected
nominees — Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William H. Rehnquist — for
vacancies on the Supreme Court.89 The President told the nation that
he had selected Powell and Rehnquist upon the belief that the
nominees shared his own conservative judicial philosophy.90 Nixon
stated “I believe some court decisions have gone too far in the past in
weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in our
society. I believe the peace forces must not be denied the legal tools
they need to protect the innocent from criminal elements.”91 Nixon’s
nomination announcement repeated themes from his 1968
presidential campaign white paper on crime, Toward Freedom From
Fear.92 In that paper, Nixon accused the Supreme Court of “seriously
hamstringing the peace forces” to the advantage of criminals, and
called for new laws or even a constitutional amendment to “redress
the balance” in favor of law enforcement.93 It is not surprising, then,
that much of the press treated the nominations of Powell and
Rehnquist as part of Nixon’s plan to change the “philosophy” of the
Court and to reverse the Warren Court’s criminal procedure rulings.94
86

Id.
Id.
88
Id.
89
See Remaking the Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 15.
90
Id. at 16.
91
Id.
92
RICHARD M. NIXON, TOWARD FREEDOM FROM FEAR (1968), reprinted in 114 CONG.
REC. 12,936, 12,936-39 (1968).
93
Id. at 12,937.
94
See, e.g., Richard Harris, Comment, NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 1971, at 39, 39 (“Now
that [Nixon] has finally made known his new choices — Lewis F. Powell, Jr. . . . and
William H. Rehnquist . . . — he has taken another step towards transforming the
Court from a progressive body into a reactionary body, as he promised.”); James M.
Naughton, Early Vote Asked, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1971, at 1 (“More important, Mr.
Nixon said, was a determination to place upon the Court those . . . whose judicial
philosophy would restore in the Court’s rulings ‘that delicate balance between the
rights of society and the rights of defendants accused of crimes against society.’”);
Remaking the Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 16 (describing President Nixon’s
announcement of nomination of Powell and Rehnquist as “slap at the Supreme Court
87
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In many ways, Powell was Nixon’s ideal nominee. Nixon wanted a
Southerner; Powell was from Virginia. Nixon wanted a person who
shared his “conservative” judicial philosophy. Powell’s speeches
certainly identified him as a conservative critic of the Warren Court.
Further, Nixon and his advisors believed that Powell was a law-andorder conservative.95 Shortly before nominating Powell, Nixon and
Powell chatted on the telephone, and Nixon told Powell that he would
never nominate someone who didn’t share his judicial philosophy, to
which Powell responded: “‘I admire that very much.’”96 Nixon had
also been told that Powell “‘backed wiretapping,’” which pleased the
President.97
Concurrent with Nixon’s nomination of Powell, Keith was pending
on the Supreme Court’s docket. The Court had postponed oral
arguments in several important cases while the President tried to fill
the two vacant spots.98 During his confirmation hearings in the
Senate, Powell heard many questions about his views on wiretapping,
especially in regard to national security situations, and references to
Keith came from more than one Senator and Powell himself.99 In an
effort to appease the Senators’ concerns, Powell assured members of
the Senate Judiciary Committee that he would keep “an open mind”100
on the issue, but he refused to take a position on the issue of
wiretapping for domestic security purposes.101 Powell mentioned that
he had not read the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Keith and that he was
not even aware of the actual facts presented in the case.102
Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana was Powell’s toughest interrogator on
wiretapping, and he was skeptical of Powell’s professed neutrality on
the issue of domestic security wiretaps. Pointing to the RichmondTimes Dispatch op-ed article, Bayh suggested that Powell had already
taken a strong position favoring the President’s inherent power to
wiretap in domestic security cases. Powell replied that he had “no
fixed view” on the issue.103 Powell then told Bayh that he wrote the

that was headed by former Chief Justice Earl Warren”).
95
See DEAN, supra note 37, at 16.
96
Id. at 217.
97
Id. at 234.
98
Remaking the Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 16.
99
Powell, supra note 39, at 206-13.
100
Id. at 206.
101
Id. at 211 (testimony of Lewis F. Powell, Jr.) (“I think my Richmond Bar talk
demonstrated, I have no fixed view on the delicate area of [domestic surveillance].”).
102
Id. at 208.
103
Id. at 213.
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op-ed article not to address wiretapping, “but to address the issue of
He insisted that his comments on electronic
repression.”104
surveillance were focused on the “hazy area where internal security
and national security, where internal dissidents are cooperating or
working affirmatively with, or are very sympathetic to countries, other
powers, that may be enemies of the United States.”105 Powell told the
Senators that the topic “is a very difficult area,” and line-drawing in
this area “is very perplexing.”106 Whether Powell’s testimony was
consistent with his op-ed article is debatable. As Dean Jeffries put it,
Powell managed to “neither repeat nor retract” his views on
wiretapping in the Richmond-Times Dispatch article, but “his published
views strongly supported warrantless wiretapping in domestic security
cases.”107 In the end, whatever inconsistencies existed would not
matter. Powell would soon be sitting on the Court.108 On December
6, 1971, just over two months before oral arguments in Keith, the
Senate confirmed Powell’s nomination to the Supreme Court.109
II.

THE KEITH OPINION

The issue in Keith concerned “the President’s power, acting through
the Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance in internal
security matters without prior judicial approval.”110 The events that
prompted the case apparently were unimportant to the result, as
Justice Powell’s opinion devotes exactly one sentence to the facts:

104

Id. at 212.
Id.
106
Id. at 213.
107
JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at 378.
108
Fred P. Graham, Senate Unit Ends Nominee Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1971,
at 22 (“No opposition on the committee has materialized against Mr. Powell.”); see
also John P. MacKenzie, Hearings End on Nominees for Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 11,
1971, at A1 (“Chairman Eastland voiced confidence that both men will win speedy
confirmation.”); National Notes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1971, at E3 (“[I]t appears likely
that Mr. Powell will win unanimous endorsement of all 16 members of the
committee.”).
109
Fred P. Graham, Senate Confirms Powell by 89 to 1 for Black’s Seat, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 1971, at 1.
110
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 299 (1972). Later in the
opinion in Part II, Powell notes that the issue before the Court had been left open in
Katz and that the case “raises no constitutional challenge to electronic surveillance as
specifically authorized by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968,” nor does the case require any “judgment on the scope of the President’s
surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or without
this country.” Id. at 308.
105
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“One of the defendants, Plamondon, was charged with the dynamite
bombing of an office of the Central Intelligence Agency in Ann Arbor,
Michigan.”111 There was, however, a bit more to the story.
Lawrence Robert “Pun” Plamondon was a co-founder of the White
Panther Party, a radical group established in 1968.112 He and his codefendants were charged with conspiracy to destroy government
property. Conversations incriminating Plamondon were captured on a
government wiretap when he telephoned members of the Black
Panther Party in Berkeley and San Francisco,113 whom the federal
government had targeted for electronic surveillance.114 Eventually,
Plamondon landed on the FBI’s Most Wanted List,115 was captured,
and was indicted with his co-defendants. Before the federal criminal
trial started,116 the defense filed a motion for the disclosure of any
information of electronic surveillance obtained by the federal
government concerning the defendants.
The government
111

Id. at 299.
Damren, supra note 9, at 8. Plamondon and one of his co-defendants, John
Sinclair, started the White Panther Party in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Id. According to
Damren, the “White Panther Manifesto,” authored by John Sinclair, described the
White Panthers as
112

[n]ot to be confused with any white supremacist or white power groups —
quite the contrary. . . . Our culture, our art, the music, newspapers, books,
posters, our clothing, our homes, the way we walk and talk, the way our hair
grows, the way we smoke dope and fuck and eat and sleep — it is all one
message, and the message is FREEDOM! . . . There’s only two kinds of
people on the planet: those who make up the problem and those who make
up the solution. WE ARE THE SOLUTION. We have no problems.
Everything is free for everybody. Money sucks. Leaders suck. School
sucks. The white honkie culture that has been handed to us on a silver
platter is meaningless to us! . . . We have no illusions. Knowing the power
of symbols in the abstract world of Americans we have taken the White
Panther as our mark to symbolize our strength and arrogance. We’re bad.
Id. at 3.
113
See JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at 375; Sklansky, The Limits of Aphorism, supra note
4, at 251.
114
According to one account, most of “the information uncovered by the [Black]
Panther wiretaps had to do with pregnancies, transportation and telephone problems,
the lack of heat in offices, calls home to mom.” KENNETH O’REILLY, “RACIAL MATTERS”:
THE FBI’S SECRET FILE ON BLACK AMERICA, 1960-1972, at 340 (1989).
115
JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at 375.
116
None of the participants in the trial could have predicted that the case would
end up as a constitutional landmark. When the trial started, “not one of the
principals, including United States Attorney [Ralph B. Guy] and his assistants, knew
that the FBI had been secretly monitoring [Plamondon’s] phone conversations for
months.” Damren, supra note 9, at 2.
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acknowledged that Plamondon had been overheard by federal
wiretaps, but contended Attorney General John Mitchell “approved
the wiretaps ‘to gather intelligence information deemed necessary to
protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack
and subvert the existing structure of the Government.’”117
Although the government insisted that the President had the
inherent power to authorize wiretaps in domestic security cases,
District Court Judge Damon Keith rejected that claim and granted the
defendants’ motion.118 Judge Keith’s decision was affirmed by the
117
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 300 (1972) (footnote
omitted).
118
United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1077, 1079-80 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
The government argued “that the President, acting through the Attorney General, has
the inherent Constitutional power: (1) to authorize without judicial warrant
electronic surveillance in ‘national security’ cases; and (2) to determine unilaterally
whether a given situation is a matter within the scope of national security.” Id. at
1077. The government’s legal stance was known as the “Mitchell Doctrine,” named
after President Nixon’s first Attorney General John Mitchell. The “foundation of the
Mitchell Doctrine was the contention that the President’s awesome responsibility for
the safety of the nation was all-encompassing; his power to authorize warrantless
wiretaps could not be made to turn on the target’s foreign ties. If anything, Mitchell
insisted, the domestic threat was more exigent than the foreign one.” FRANK J.
DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND METHODS OF AMERICA’S POLITICAL
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 247 (1980). As one scholar has explained, the Mitchell Doctrine
was prompted by the confluence of Katz and Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165
(1969). Katz meant that evidence from warrantless electronic surveillance could not
be used in federal prosecutions. Katz’s holding was problematic because, “[u]nless
the administration could convince the courts that warrantless wiretapping [in national
security situations] was not barred by the Fourth Amendment, the road to prosecution
of radical and dissenting groups, winding through a thicket of national security
surveillances, might be quite risky.” DONNER, supra, at 246. The problem for the
government created by Katz was exacerbated by Alderman, which ruled that
“surveillance records as to which any [defendant] has standing to object should be
turned over to him without being screened in camera by the trial judge.” Alderman,
394 U.S. at 182. The “government was stunned” by Alderman’s disclosure rule and
“protested that compliance would be highly embarrassing” because in some
prosecutions, defendants had been overheard by wiretaps targeting foreign embassies.
DONNER, supra, at 246. But the Nixon Administration’s protest over Alderman
“concealed a deeper fear: the impact of the decision on the prosecution of domestic
radicals and dissenters who had themselves been targets of microphone surveillance
and wiretaps. If the records of such surveillance were released to the trial court, the
entire national security game, with its dubious claims of linkages between domestic
targets and foreign principals so substantial as to justify executive intervention, would
be exposed.” Id.
In the Supreme Court, the government abandoned the claim that the President had
inherent power to wiretap in domestic security cases, see infra note 122 and
accompanying text, but it did urge the Court to “reconsider Alderman v. United States
and hold that the requirement of automatic disclosure of interceptions to defendants
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Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.119 That is where things stood
when Keith arrived at the Court.
The critical portions of Justice Powell’s Fourth Amendment analysis
in Keith are in Parts II and III of his opinion.120 Part II sets the stage
for Part III, which plainly rejects the government’s claims that the
President has the power to authorize warrantless electronic
surveillance in domestic security cases. There are a few points worth
highlighting about Part II of Powell’s opinion. First, Justice Powell
says little about the government’s argument. After losing before Judge
Keith, the government argued in the Court of the Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit that the President had inherent authority to order national
security wiretaps without prior judicial approval. According to the
appellate court, the government insisted that “the President of the
United States, in his capacity as Chief Executive, has unique powers of
the ‘sovereign’ which serve to exempt him and his agents from the
judicial review restrictions of the Fourth Amendment.”121
In the Supreme Court, the government abandoned the “inherent
powers” argument.122 There, the central theme of the government’s

announced in that case is inapplicable [in cases involving national security]
surveillance.” Brief for United States at 36, Keith, 407 U.S. 297 (No. 70-153) (citation
omitted). In Keith, the Court explained that it would not reconsider Alderman’s
holding. Keith, 407 U.S. at 324 n.21.
119
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 444 F.2d 651, 669 (6th Cir. 1971).
120
Before discussing the constitutional question, Justice Powell rejected the
government’s contention that § 2511(3) of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), should be
“viewed as a recognition or affirmance of a constitutional authority in the President to
conduct warrantless domestic security surveillance.” Keith, 407 U.S. at 303. The
pertinent portion of § 2511(3) relied upon by the government provided:
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the
constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems
necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the
Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear
and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3). According to Justice Powell, § 2511(3) conferred no power on
the President to wiretap in domestic security cases. Keith, 407 U.S. at 303.
121
Keith, 444 F.2d at 657.
122
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Keith, 407 U.S. 297 (No. 70-153) (“We
suggest in this regard that we are not asking for an exemption of the Fourth
Amendment. We do not suggest the President is above the Fourth Amendment. We
simply suggest that in the area in which he has limited and exclusive authority, the
President of the United States may authorize an electronic surveillance, and in those
cases it is reasonable.”); cf. id. at 49 (according to counsel for respondent, “[We don’t
subscribe to the inherent power argument”). Counsel noted that “[t]he government
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argument was that the Fourth Amendment only requires that searches
not be “unreasonable,” and that the President’s decision to authorize
electronic surveillance in domestic cases satisfies the reasonableness
Further, the government did not contend that
standard.123
authorization by the President or the Attorney General “itself
establishes compliance with the Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness.”124 Rather, the government asked the Court “only to
hold that the absence of prior judicial approval does not invalidate the
search under th[e reasonableness] standard.”125 The government
requested the Court to adopt the principle stated in Justice White’s
concurrence in Katz: “We should not require the warrant procedure
and the magistrate’s judgment if the President . . . or . . . the Attorney
General has considered the requirements of national security and
authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.”126
Although the government denied it,127 arguing that the warrant
requirement does not apply to the President and that high-ranking
Executive Branch officials can decide whether national security
wiretaps are reasonable was the equivalent of arguing that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to the President. Justice Powell reached
that conclusion in Part III of his opinion. In fact, very quickly — in
the second paragraph of Part II — Justice Powell tips his hand on the
outcome. He explained that whether the President has the authority
to authorize wiretapping in national security cases without prior
judicial approval “requires the essential Fourth Amendment inquiry
into the ‘reasonableness’ of the search and seizure in question, and the
way in which that ‘reasonableness’ derives content and meaning
through reference to the warrant clause.”128 This observation was a
prelude to Justice Powell’s ultimate conclusion that the procedural
safeguards of the Warrant Clause do control the President’s authority
in this area.
made [the inherent power argument] in the lower court and in the Court of Appeals.
It withdrew from [the inherent power argument] in its main brief in this case, and
now it seems to be back to the inherent power argument.”).
123
Brief for United States, supra note 118, at 6-7.
124
Id. at 10.
125
Id.
126
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967) (White, J., concurring).
127
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 122, at 7 (“We do not contend
here, Your Honors, the President of the United States, either individually or acting
through the Attorney General, is exempt from the provisions of the Fourth
Amendment or is above the provisions of the Constitution.”).
128
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 309-10 (1972) (citation
omitted).
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The second noteworthy feature of Part II of Powell’s opinion is his
reply to the government’s claim that the surveillance at stake here was
not as constitutionally intrusive as a physical search of a home or
person, and is thus subject to different Fourth Amendment
limitations. In its brief, the government asserted that surveillance of a
telephone conversation, “and particularly where, as here, the speaker’s
own telephone has not been tapped but the overhearing results from
his telephone call to a number that is under surveillance — involves a
lesser invasion of privacy than a physical search of a man’s home or
his person.”129 The government conceded, as it had to after Katz, that
wiretapping was subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. But the
government contended that a “reasonableness” analysis “properly
should take cognizance of the extent of the invasion of privacy
involved.”130
Without explicitly acknowledging this argument, Justice Powell
rejected it. After noting that physical entry of the home is the central
concern of the text of the Fourth Amendment, he added that the
Amendment’s “broader spirit now shields private speech from
unreasonable surveillance.”131 According to Justice Powell, Katz
“implicitly recognized that the broad and unsuspected governmental
incursions into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance
entails necessitate the application of Fourth Amendment
safeguards.”132 Put another way, telephone wiretapping — whether
such surveillance captures the words of the target of government
interest or third parties who happen to call the target — is just as
constitutionally offensive as a search of a home. Once this point is
understood, no neutral principle supports the claim that different
Fourth Amendment rules should apply to electronic surveillance.
Finally, at the end of Part II, Justice Powell raised a constitutional
concern rarely seen in Fourth Amendment rulings of that period.
Powell’s concern surprised some observers of the Court in light of his
previously published views. The Court’s search and seizure docket in
the late 1960s and early 1970s typically involved police investigations
aimed at illegal narcotics or violent crime. Fourth Amendment cases
implicating or threatening First Amendment free speech values were
seldom addressed by the Court during this time.133 Even rarer were
129

Brief for United States, supra note 118, at 13 (citation omitted).
Id.
131
Keith, 407 U.S. at 313 (citations omitted).
132
Id. (citation omitted).
133
Although the Court rarely decided cases involving police searches and seizures
that also implicated First Amendment concerns, occasionally such cases did surface.
130
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cases where a criminal defendant argued that free speech concerns
justified excluding evidence of criminality obtained from a
government search. In fact, the defendants in Keith were not engaged
in constitutionally protected free speech; they were charged with
conspiring to bomb a CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Although
Plamondon, the actual bomber, lacked a viable First Amendment
claim against the government’s attempts to introduce his incriminating
conversations at trial, ironically, a critical component of the
government’s argument unintentionally aided his case in the Supreme
Court.
The government stressed that the challenged surveillance was
conducted “in order to gather intelligence information that the
Attorney General, acting on behalf of the President, concluded was
necessary to protect the national security.”134 Thus, the government’s
primary motivation in conducting domestic security wiretaps was not
to develop evidence for future criminal prosecutions, “but protection
of the fabric of society itself.”135 Protecting the “fabric of society
itself,” like protecting “national security” is a vague concept, subject to
abuse. As the briefs of the defendants and several amici reminded the
Court, warrantless electronic surveillance of political dissenters and
opponents of the Vietnam War, including individuals like Martin
Luther King, Jr., had been justified by Executive Branch officials in the
name of “national security.”136 Indeed, the threat to First Amendment
values of free speech and freedom of association posed by warrantless
surveillance was a common, if not the predominant, theme in the

See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 506 (1973) (holding that sheriff’s warrantless
seizure of allegedly obscene film, contemporaneous with and incident to arrest for
public exhibition of film, violated Fourth Amendment); cf. Heller v. New York, 413
U.S. 483, 492-93 (1973) (permitting judicial officer authorized to issue warrant, who
has viewed film and finds it to be obscene, to issue constitutionally valid warrant for
film’s seizure as evidence in prosecution against exhibitor of film without first holding
adversary hearing on issue of probable obscenity). Later in the 1970s, in Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978), the Court upheld the execution of a search
warrant targeting a student newspaper even when members of the newspaper staff
were not suspected of crime or subject to arrest.
134
Brief for United States, supra note 118, at 13.
135
Id. at 14.
136
Brief for the Defendant-Respondents at 106, Keith, 407 U.S. 297 (No. 70-153);
Brief of the International Union et al. as Amic[i] Curiae in Support of Respondents at
34-36, Keith, 407 U.S. 297 (No. 70-153) [hereinafter International Union Brief].
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briefs filed by the defendants and their supporting amici.137 These
arguments did not go unnoticed by Justice Powell.
Without disputing the motivations behind national security wiretaps
or the legitimate need for such surveillance, Justice Powell noted that
national security cases “often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth
While
Amendment values not present in ‘ordinary’ crime.”138
acknowledging that Executive Branch officials may have a “stronger”
investigative obligation in cases that threaten domestic security,
Justice Powell stated that such cases also pose “greater jeopardy to
constitutionally protected speech.”139
These were surprising
statements to be found in an opinion authored by Lewis Powell. Less
than a year earlier, Powell’s Richmond-Times Dispatch op-ed article
asserted that “the outcry over wiretapping is a tempest in a teapot,”
and that “[l]aw-abiding citizens have nothing to fear” because
governmental wiretaps “are directed against people who prey on their
fellow citizens or who seek to subvert our democratic form of
government.”140 In the Keith case, however, Justice Powell’s focus was
markedly different from his op-ed column. Now, rather than
discussing the violent nature of Plamondon’s crimes and his nexus to
others who might be plotting violence against the government, Powell
was focused on the threat to constitutional liberties that came from
Executive Branch wiretapping. Justice Powell now saw wiretapping as
a clear danger to open and robust speech criticizing government
policies:
History
abundantly
documents
the
tendency
of
Government — however benevolent and benign its motives —
to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its
policies. Fourth Amendment protections become the more
necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be those
suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger
to political dissent is acute where the Government attempts to
act under so vague a concept as the power to protect
“domestic security.” Given the difficulty of defining the
137
See Brief for the Defendant-Respondents, supra note 136, at 102-15;
International Union Brief, supra note 136, at 34-36; see also Brief of the ACLU and the
ACLU of Michigan, Amici Curiae at 26-29, Keith, 407 U.S. 297 (No. 70-153). See
generally Brief of American Friends Service Committee as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents’ Position, Keith, 407 U.S. 297 (No. 70-153) (arguing that government’s
eavesdropping power violates First Amendment right of association).
138
Keith, 407 U.S. at 313.
139
Id.
140
Powell, supra note 12, at 215.
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domestic security interest, the danger of abuse in acting to
protect that interest becomes apparent . . . . The price of lawful
public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an
unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of
unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen
dissent and discussion of Government action in private
conversation. For private dissent, no less than open public
discourse, is essential to our free society.141
In Part III of Justice Powell’s opinion, he unapologetically reaffirmed
the warrant requirement. In addition, he emphatically rejected the
government’s argument that the President and his deputies can decide
by themselves whether electronic surveillance in domestic security
cases is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Perhaps the most
remarkable thing in retrospect about this section of Powell’s opinion is
that he applied traditional Fourth Amendment norms to each of the
government’s claims in a manner that left no room for later
manipulation.
Implicit in Justice Powell’s analysis was the belief that the
applicability of the warrant requirement does not turn on whether the
challenged search is supported by a legitimate or unusual government
need. The fact that national security wiretaps may promote pressing
or important public interests — for example, gathering intelligence
information to protect the nation — does not resolve the
constitutional inquiry on whether the warrant requirement applies to
such searches. Put another way, the fact that domestic security
wiretaps “are necessary does not prove that it is necessary that they be
made without a warrant.”142 The Court, Powell wrote, must consider
“whether the needs of citizens for privacy and free expression may not
be better protected by requiring a warrant before such surveillance is
undertaken,” and “whether a warrant requirement would unduly
frustrate the efforts of Government to protect itself from acts of
subversion and overthrow directed against it.”143
Without saying so, Justice Powell was relying, in part, on the
formula announced in Camara v. Municipal Court.144 In Camara, the
State argued its legitimate interest in discovering and enforcing
housing code violations justified warrantless administrative searches
141

Keith, 407 U.S. at 314.
Wayne R. LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment:
Camara and See Cases, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 22.
143
Keith, 407 U.S. at 315.
144
387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
142

The
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of private homes.145 Ultimately rejecting this argument, Camara
explained that the applicability of the warrant requirement turns “not
[on] whether the public interest justifies the type of search in question
but whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant,
which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a
warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search.”146 Camara held that a homeowner could not be punished for
refusing to allow a warrantless administrative search of his home and
that the warrant requirement did apply to such searches.147
Significantly, Camara endorsed the warrant requirement even though
the facts, like Keith, did not involve a traditional police search for
criminal evidence that would be used in a future prosecution.148
Indeed, Camara would subsequently be interpreted as solidifying the
warrant requirement as a core precept in Fourth Amendment law.149
As Professor Wayne LaFave would later explain, the decision in
Camara to apply the warrant requirement to housing inspections was
based partially on the belief that “the warrant process in this setting is
not so much a check upon unjustified searches as it is upon arbitrary
searches.”150 Each of these features of Camara seemed to influence
Powell’s thinking in Keith.
For example, because the warrant requirement does not ebb and
flow depending on the nature of the governmental interest promoted
by the search or conduct under investigation, Powell easily and firmly
rejected the government’s “reasonableness” argument. In its brief, the
government emphasized that the “Fourth Amendment does not forbid
all searches and seizures without a warrant, since there is no
constitutional requirement that there must always be judicial
authorization before a search or seizure can be made.”151 Therefore,
according to the government, the Amendment only requires that

145

Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 533.
147
Id. at 534.
148
Id. at 528-29 (“[O]ne governing principle, justified by history and by current
experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes
of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it
has been authorized by a valid search warrant.” (citations omitted)).
149
Cf. Sklansky, The Limits of Aphorism, supra note 4, at 239 (observing that
Camara “considerably bolstered the position of the warrant requirement as the ‘one
unifying principle’ of search and seizure law” (footnote omitted)).
150
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 10.1(c), at 20 (4th ed. 2004).
151
Brief for United States, supra note 118, at 12 (citations omitted).
146
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searches authorized by the President or Attorney General be
reasonable.152
Again, without citing the government’s argument explicitly, Justice
Powell unambiguously rejected it. He stated that “the definition of
‘reasonableness’ turns, at least in part, on the more specific commands
of the warrant clause.”153 He replied that the government’s contention
that the Amendment merely requires a general “reasonableness”
standard “has not been accepted” by prior precedent.154 To underline
the point, and employing a somewhat uncharacteristic style, he
observed: “The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not dead
language.”155 Powell concluded that the warrant requirement, and not
a post hoc “reasonableness” standard, was the core means of
protecting Fourth Amendment liberties. Seeking a magistrate’s
approval before commencing a search, a legal principle established
two centuries earlier, was “the very heart of the Fourth Amendment
directive.”156 Thus, “where practical, a governmental search and
seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer to gather
evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the
collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen’s private
premises or conversation.”157
Leaving no uncertainty about his reasoning or the result, Justice
Powell unmistakably asserted that “Fourth Amendment freedoms
cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may
be conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch.”158
In other words, presidential discretion to conduct national security
surveillance is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. Neither the
President nor the Attorney General can act as the neutral and detached
magistrate contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the
government’s claim that Executive Branch officials could decide on
their own to conduct electronic surveillance was directly at odds with
the origins and purpose of the Amendment: “The historical judgment,
which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive
discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating
152
Id. at 6 (“We submit that an electronic surveillance authorized by the Attorney
General as necessary to protect the national security is not an unreasonable search and
seizure solely because it is conducted without prior judicial approval.”).
153
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972).
154
Id. at 315 n.16.
155
Id. at 315.
156
Id. at 316.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 316-17.
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evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected
speech.”159 The government’s position was not saved by its concession
that the decision to wiretap was subject to an “extremely limited”160
post hoc judicial review. After-the-fact judicial review would only be
available when the government initiated a prosecution, and, of course,
there would be no judicial assessment for wiretaps which did not
prompt criminal charges.161 For Justice Powell and the rest of the
Keith majority, “[p]rior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is
the time-tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment rights.”162
The final section of Part III addressed the government’s argument
that circumstances surrounding domestic security searches justify an
exception to the warrant requirement. Here, the government pressed
several points, the most prominent being that “prior judicial review
would obstruct the President in the discharge of his constitutional
duty to protect domestic security.”163 Tellingly, Justice Powell’s reply
to this claim was succinct and unequivocal: The President’s domestic
security functions “must be exercised in a manner compatible with the
159

Id. at 317 (citation omitted).
Brief for United States, supra note 118, at 22. Under the government’s proposal,
the Judiciary should approve electronic surveillance authorized by the Attorney
General unless it appears that the Attorney General’s decision is “arbitrary and
capricious, i.e., that it constitutes a clear abuse of the broad discretion that the
Attorney General has to obtain all information that will be helpful to the President in
protecting the government against ‘overthrow’ . . . by force or other unlawful means or
against any other clear and present danger to [its] structure or existence . . . .” Id.
(quoting Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102520 (2000 & Supp. IV. 2004)). The government also asserted that a judge should
not substitute his or her judgment “for that of the Attorney General on whether the
particular organization, person or event involved has a sufficient nexus to protection
of the national security to justify surveillance.” Id.
161
It could also be noted that under the government’s proposal, “where there was
no intention to prosecute, the [subject of the wiretap] might suffer violation of his
rights without ever learning about it. In addition, in a so-called intelligence
investigation, there was no natural terminus of the surveillance, in contrast to a
criminal investigation, in which the accumulation of wiretap evidence culminates in a
decision either to seek an indictment or to end the investigation.” DONNER, supra note
118, at 248.
162
Keith, 407 U.S. at 318 (citation omitted).
163
Id. The government also contended an exception to the warrant requirement
was proper because domestic security wiretaps were “directed primarily to the
collecting and maintaining of intelligence with respect to subversive forces, and are
not an attempt to gather evidence for specific criminal prosecutions.” Id. at 318-19.
Additionally, the government argued that judges lacked the competence to determine
whether probable cause existed to protect national security, and that disclosure of
national security information to judges created the risk of leaks from court personnel.
Id. at 319.
160
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Fourth Amendment.”164 Recognizing that judicial approval of national
security searches will impose “some added burden” on Executive
Branch officials, Justice Powell stated that “this inconvenience is
justified in a free society to protect constitutional values.”165 Equally
important for Powell was “the reassurance of the public generally that
indiscriminate wiretapping and bugging of law-abiding citizens cannot
occur.”166
In sum, Justice Powell’s constitutional analysis in Keith was concise
and directly aligned with the Warren Court’s Fourth Amendment
precedent. Like his predecessors on the Warren Court, Justice Powell
embraced the constitutional norm that law enforcement officials must,
“‘whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches
and seizures through the warrant procedure.’”167 Looking back, it is
evident from Justice Powell’s opinion that there was nothing about the
case that required a departure from mainstream Fourth Amendment
doctrine. To the contrary, the threat to free speech interests that
national security wiretaps posed provided more, not less, reason to
insist on prior judicial approval before allowing such surveillance.
Accordingly, Justice Powell ruled that the warrant requirement, and
not a “reasonableness” standard, is the yardstick for determining the
constitutionality of electronic surveillance. As was true in Katz,168 it
did not matter that the challenged surveillance in Keith was reasonable
under the totality of the circumstances.169 The specific facts of the

164
Id. at 320. Justice Powell also dismissed the government’s other justifications
for an exception to the warrant requirement. He concluded that the purpose of the
wiretap — whether it be for intelligence gathering or criminal investigation — did not
justify an exception because either purpose “risks infringement of constitutionally
protected privacy of speech.” He found no merit in the government’s judicial
incompetence argument. There was no basis for finding that federal judges “will be
insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic security cases.”
He added: “If the threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement
officers to convey its significance to a court, one may question whether there is
probable cause for surveillance.” Lastly, he concluded that judicial review could be
consistent with the government’s obvious need for secrecy. Id. at 320-21.
165
Id. at 321.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 318 (citations omitted).
168
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967) (acknowledging that FBI
agents who monitored Katz’s phone calls “acted with restraint”).
While
acknowledging that the agents had probable cause to monitor Katz’s calls and showed
restraint by overhearing only the conversations of Katz himself, id. at 354, Katz
explained that “the inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents
themselves, not by a judicial officer.” Id.
169
See Keith, 407 U.S. at 317 (“It may well be that, in the instant case, the
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defendants’ crime were unimportant, just as the operational details of
the Executive Branch’s decision to wiretap the Black Panther Party
were constitutionally irrelevant.
What was relevant was that
electronic surveillance of Plamondon’s telephone calls had occurred
without judicial approval. Rather than employing a totality test that
measured the “reasonableness” of the government’s surveillance,
Justice Powell’s analysis was more straightforward: the infringement
of constitutional interests was too costly to allow national security
wiretaps absent judicial approval.170
Thus, Justice Powell concluded that the warrant requirement applies
to national security searches authorized by the President, just as it
applies to traditional law enforcement searches.
Presidential
discretion to authorize wiretaps directly conflicts with the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment, which was to check the discretion of
Executive Branch officials to invade the privacy of individuals.
Finally, the government’s concerns — including its concern that a
warrant requirement would obstruct the President’s duty to protect
the nation’s security — did not justify a new exception “from the
customary Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval prior
to initiation of a search or surveillance.”171 Despite the “important”
and “delicate” nature of the issue before the Court,172 Justice Powell
provided a clear answer that left no room for evasion or debate —
“warrantless wiretaps in domestic security cases were flatly
unconstitutional.”173

Government’s surveillance of Plamondon’s conversations was a reasonable one which
readily would have gained prior judicial approval.”).
170
See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Wilkey, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (describing comparative analysis of Keith, which “found
that the cost in terms of infringement on Fourth and First Amendment values was too
high to justify allowing a national security surveillance to be conducted without a
warrant”).
171
Keith, 407 U.S. at 321.
172
Id. at 299.
173
JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at 379. Justice White’s concurrence in Keith contended
that the challenged surveillance was illegal under Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and thus it was “unnecessary” and “improper” to
reach the constitutional question of the President’s power to authorize national
security wiretaps. Keith, 407 U.S. at 340 (White, J., concurring). Of course, Justice
White did not bother mentioning that he had already gone on record in Katz as
concluding that the warrant requirement did not apply “if the President . . . or . . . the
Attorney General[] has considered the requirements of national security and
authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 364 (White, J.,
concurring). In any event, in Keith, Justice White took the view that the Attorney
General’s affidavit did not satisfy the statutory language of section 2511(3) of Title III.
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III. WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE FOR FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE
In the weeks following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
President Bush authorized the NSA to initiate the TSP.174 While the
precise details of the TSP remain confidential, the government has
acknowledged that, as originally implemented, the program involves
electronic surveillance without judicial approval. Specifically, the TSP
covers “telephone and email communications where one party to the
communication is located outside the United States and the NSA has ‘a
reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a
member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an
organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al
Qaeda.’”175
A. The ACLU’s Challenge to the Terrorist Surveillance Program
Disclosure of the TSP triggered a wave of criticism across the
political spectrum.176 Soon, a group of plaintiffs filed a federal lawsuit
According to Justice White, the affidavit did not allege that “the surveillance was
necessary to prevent overthrow by force or other unlawful means or that there was
any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.”
Keith, 407 U.S. at 341. As Dean Jeffries has explained, “[T]he result of White’s
position was that the Administration would lose this particular case but could still
claim that it had the right to act without a warrant in future cases.” JEFFRIES, supra
note 15, at 379. Not only did Justice Powell reject that result, he said it in a way that
left no wiggle room for the Nixon Administration or future administrations to lawfully
evade Fourth Amendment restrictions in national security cases.
174
The existence of the TSP was initially disclosed in the New York Times. See
James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. The next day, President George Bush acknowledged the
operation of the TSP. ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 648 n.1 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted).
175
ACLU, 493 F.3d at 648 (citation omitted).
176
See, e.g., ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., THE U.S. FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT AND THE U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
COURT OF REVIEW: AN OVERVIEW (2007) (analyzing constitutional and statutory issues
raised by TSP); Jess Bravin, Senator Plans to Seek Hearings on Bush’s Surveillance
Program, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2005, at A4 (citing criticism by Senator Russell
Feingold and Harvard Law Professor Philip Heymann, who was deputy attorney
general in Clinton Justice Department); Dan Eggen & Walter Pincus, Ex-Justice
Lawyer Rips Case for Spying; White House’s Legal Justifications Called Weak, WASH.
POST, Mar. 9, 2006, at A3 (“A former senior national security lawyer at the Justice
Department [David S. Kris] is highly critical of some of the Bush administration’s key
legal justifications for warrantless spying.”); Neil King, Jr., Senators Focus on
Wiretapping Program; Legality of President’s Moves Will Be the Crucial, but Hard to
Answer, Issue at Hearings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2006, at A4 (“Several former
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challenging the legality of the TSP. The plaintiffs, who included
journalists, academics, and lawyers, claimed that they regularly
“communicate with individuals located overseas, whom the plaintiffs
believe are the types of people the NSA suspects of being al Qaeda
terrorists, affiliates, or supporters, and are therefore likely to be
monitored under the TSP.”177 Their lawsuit contended, inter alia, that
warrantless electronic surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment.178
The government replied that the district court should not address the
merits of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claim because the plaintiffs
could not prove that any of their conversations or email had ever been
monitored by the TSP. Accordingly, the plaintiffs lacked standing to
litigate their Fourth Amendment claim.179
government lawyers and constitutional scholars, including Mr. [Morton] Halperin
[who helped to draft the original Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act law and is now
the Washington Director of the Open Society Institute, a public policy think tank],
have challenged Mr. Bush’s legal defense of the NSA eavesdropping program . . . . One
critique, signed by 14 legal scholars and sent last week to certain members of
Congress, said the analysis failed ‘to identify any plausible legal authority for such
surveillance.’”); Eric Lichtblau, Republican Who Oversees N.S.A. Calls for Wiretap
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2006, at A12 (“[Four] of the 10 Republicans on the Senate
Judiciary Committee voiced concerns about the [terrorist surveillance] program at a
hearing where Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales testified . . . .”); Beth Nolan et
al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, 53 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 42 (2006) (criticizing
legality of TSP); David E. Sanger & Eric Lichtblau, Administration Starts Weeklong
Blitz in Defense of Eavesdropping Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, at A18
(“Democrats and some Republicans have attacked the program as illegal and
unconstitutional, and an analysis from the nonpartisan Congressional Research
Service has strongly questioned its legal underpinnings.”); Anne Marie Squeo,
Gonzales Defends NSA Eavesdropping, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2006, at A3 (quoting Mary
DeRosa, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington public policy think tank, and member of National Security Council staff
under President Clinton) (“[T]he analysis they’ve used for the NSA program . . .
would make the president’s authority almost unlimited and the other branches of
government almost irrelevant.”); see also Yoo, supra note 24, at 566-69.
177
ACLU, 493 F.3d at 648.
178
Brief for Appellees at 42, ACLU, 493 F.3d 644 (Nos. 06-2095 & 06-2140). The
plaintiffs also claimed that warrantless surveillance under the TSP is a violation of the
First Amendment, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), and Title
III. ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
179
Throughout the litigation in the ACLU v. NSA case, the Administration has
argued that the state secrets privilege “not only prevents plaintiffs from establishing
their standing, it also precludes consideration of the merits of their claims.” Brief of
Appellants, supra note 24, at 31. According to the government, the state secrets
privilege precludes the type of fact-specific inquiry that would be needed to assess the
merits of plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims. See id. at 32 (“[T]he Supreme Court
has long recognized that warrantless searches may be constitutional so long as they
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Regarding the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim, the government insisted
that the procedural safeguards of the Fourth Amendment — judicial
approval before searching, probable cause to justify the search, and
particularity describing the communications to be seized — do not
apply to the TSP because the President possesses the inherent power,
notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment, to authorize warrantless
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence.180 Additionally, the
government argued that the TSP searches were reasonable under the
special needs exception to the warrant requirement.181 The district
court, after rejecting the government’s contention that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to bring their Fourth Amendment claim, ruled that
the TSP violated the Fourth Amendment because it authorized
searches without judicial approval.182 Accordingly, the district court
issued a permanent injunction against further use of the TSP. The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, vacated the district
court’s order enjoining operation of the TSP. Without addressing the
merits of any of the plaintiffs’ constitutional or statutory claims,183 the
appellate court concluded that none of the plaintiffs had standing to
litigate their claims.184

are reasonable under the circumstances — a context-specific inquiry that directly calls
for consideration of information protected by the state secrets privilege.”).
180
Id. at 34-35.
181
Id. at 36-38.
182
ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 773-75.
183
Before the appellate court’s opinion was issued, on January 17, 2007, the Bush
Administration announced that it was dismantling the TSP and would conduct future
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence under the terms of FISA. See ACLU,
493 F.3d at 710 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (quoting Letter from Alberto Gonzales,
Attorney General of the United States, to The Honorable Patrick Leahy & The
Honorable Arlen Specter 1 (Jan. 17, 2007)) (“[A]ny electronic surveillance that was
occurring as part of the Terrorist Surveillance Program will now be conducted subject
to the approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.”). But during oral
argument at the appellate court, counsel for the government acknowledged “that the
President maintains that he has the authority to ‘opt out’ of the FISA framework at any
time and to reauthorize the TSP or a similar program.” Id. at 712.
Regarding the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, the appellate court noted that their
appeal raised “a cascade of serious questions.” Id. at 652 n.5. These included: “Has
the NSA violated the United States Constitution — the First Amendment, the Fourth
Amendment, or the Separation of Powers Doctrine? Or, has the NSA violated federal
statute — the APA, FISA, or Title III? If the NSA has violated a federal statute, is that
statute constitutional when applied to the NSA in this manner? If the NSA has
violated either the Constitution or a valid federal statute, is an injunction justified?
And, if an injunction is justified, what is its proper scope?” Id.
184
See ACLU, 493 F.3d at 665-74.
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The Fourth Amendment issue left unaddressed by the Sixth Circuit
has been discussed and debated since Franklin Roosevelt’s
presidency.185 In light of its ruling that the plaintiffs in ACLU v. NSA
lacked standing to litigate their claims, it was proper for the Court of
Appeals not to address the plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory
claims against the TSP. Although the Supreme Court has yet to
resolve the Fourth Amendment issue presented by the TSP, the Court
may be compelled to address this issue in another case.186 Moreover,
the TSP and the Bush Administration’s legal claims supporting it have
generated a significant amount of attention and controversy.187
B. The Relevance of FISA
Before discussing the government’s most recent defense of the TSP,
a brief description of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(“FISA”)188 is appropriate for a few reasons. To begin with, there is a
direct line connecting Katz, Title III, Keith, and FISA. Title III’s
authorization of electronic surveillance in criminal investigations was
a response to Katz’s holding.189 Keith extended Katz’s holding to
national security cases and concluded that there was no reason to
exempt the President from the warrant requirement.190 FISA was a
response to Keith and congressional findings that Executive Branch
185
See DONNER, supra note 118, at 241-42; see also Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d
594, 616 n.53 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (plurality opinion) (listing sources).
186
See In re NSA Telecomm. Records Litig. No. 06-1791 VRW, 2007 WL 2127345
(N.D. Cal. July 24, 2007); Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d
1190 (9th Cir. 2007) (remanding to district court plaintiffs’ claim that government’s
alleged violation of FISA trumps the state secrets privilege). There is also a criminal
case in upstate New York which might provide a vehicle for challenging the TSP. See
Adam Liptak, Spying Program May Be Tested By Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2007, at A1. In that case, a defendant, Yassin M. Aref, an imam who lives in Albany,
New York, contends that he has proof that he was subjected to illegal surveillance by
the NSA. Id.
187
In addition to the articles already cited discussing the TSP, see also Wilson R.
Huhn, Congress Has the Power to Enforce the Bill of Rights Against the Federal
Government: Therefore FISA is Constitutional and the President’s Terrorist Surveillance
Program is Illegal, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on file
with author) (listing additional articles discussing TSP).
188
FISA, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-1871 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
189
See FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 247-75 (1970) (describing
how Warren Court rulings, especially Katz, lead to enactment of federal wiretap
legislation); see also Richard Harris, Annals of Legislation: The Turning Point, NEW
YORKER, Dec. 14, 1968, at 68 (discussing politics surrounding enactment of Title III).
190
See supra Part II.
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officials had, under the guise of seeking foreign intelligence
information, violated the Fourth Amendment rights of Americans by
conducting warrantless electronic surveillance for political and
illegitimate reasons.191
Understanding FISA and its scope is important for other reasons
that pertain to the constitutionality of the TSP. FISA’s enactment was
not intended only to moot the issue left open in Keith, namely,
whether the President had any inherent power to authorize
warrantless surveillance within the United States.
FISA also
represented Congress’s judgment that a judicial warrant was needed to
ensure that electronic surveillance within the country, even for foreign
intelligence purposes, satisfied the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.192 Put another way, the rulings in Katz and Keith did
more than provide guidelines for FISA’s structure. FISA was an
acknowledgment by Congress that the Fourth Amendment required
prior judicial approval before the communications of Americans

191
Cf. Robert Bloom & William J. Dunn, The Constitutional Infirmity of Warrantless
NSA Surveillance: The Abuse of Presidential Power and the Injury to the Fourth
Amendment, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 147, 159 (2006) (“Keith also recognized that
different protective schemes may be required when distinguishing between efforts to
conduct general criminal surveillance and those that involve domestic security.
Congress would accept this invitation to provide a separate but integrated protective
scheme for electronic surveillance driven by national security interests with the
passage of FISA.” (citations omitted)); Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (And
Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 803 (1989) (noting that Keith’s
explanation “regarding the flexibility that would be permissible under the fourth
amendment paved the way for FISA and its carefully tailored provisions for
surveillance of foreign powers and their agents in the United States”); id. at 806
(stating that Keith “invited Congress to develop standards” for foreign intelligence
surveillance that differed from Title III, and “[t]hese standards, according to [Keith],
could include less precise findings of probable cause and even a specially designed
court to authorize sensitive activities” (footnote omitted)); Sims, supra note 32, at 109
(explaining that Keith suggested “a possible way of reconciling a warrant requirement
with the practicalities of the intelligence field”; that Keith “provides the backbone of
the legislative compromise over foreign intelligence surveillance that became [FISA]”;
and that between Keith and the enactment of FISA “Congress devoted substantial
attention to infringements of civil liberties by agencies of the United States” (footnote
omitted)).
192
See Nolan et al., supra note 176, at 44 (“[S]erious Fourth Amendment questions
about the validity of warrantless wiretapping led Congress to enact FISA, in order to
‘provide the secure framework by which the executive branch may conduct legitimate
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes within the context of this
nation’s commitment to privacy and individual rights.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-604,
at 15 (1978))).
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within the country could be monitored by the government for foreign
intelligence purposes.193
FISA has been described as “a very complex and difficult statute that
reflects a multitude of compromises between the Executive, the
Congress, and the various interest groups that influenced its
development.”194 Notwithstanding its complexity, certain features of
FISA are straightforward and are especially pertinent when assessing
the constitutionality of the TSP. FISA generally regulates the
government’s power to use electronic surveillance and other
investigative means within the United States for foreign intelligence
purposes. Specifically, the statute allows the issuance of judicial
warrants for foreign intelligence purposes from a secret court, the
FISA court (“FISC”).195 That court is comprised of a select number of
federal judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States, and
provides streamlined procedures and secrecy provisions unavailable
under Title III.196
More importantly, issuance of a FISA warrant differs from Title III
and the traditional warrant process. Normally (and under Title III), a
judge can issue a search or arrest warrant if she determines that the
government shows probable cause that the target of the search or
seizure has committed or is likely to commit a crime. Under FISA,
however, a judge must issue a warrant if the application satisfies
certain statutory criteria.197
Specifically, if the government
193
Cf. Huhn, supra note 187 (commenting that “Congress enacted FISA in 1978,
and it is abundantly clear that FISA was intended to protect the Fourth Amendment
rights of American citizens and lawfully resident aliens against encroachment by
agents of the federal government acting under the shield of ‘national security’”); David
S. Eggert, Note, Executive Order 12,333: An Assessment of the Validity of Warrantless
National Security Searches, 1983 DUKE L.J. 611, 638 (“Congress passed the FISA in the
aftermath of the Keith case and the abuses that occurred during the Watergate years.
It is reasonable to assume that Congress believed the courts would require the
president and the investigative agencies to obtain warrants before conducting
searches, as defined in Katz.”).
194
William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical Searches for
Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Executive Order 12,333 and The Fourth Amendment, 35
CATH. U. L. REV. 97, 157 (1985); see also Cole, supra note 33, at 20 (“At that time, and
today, FISA comprehensively regulates electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
purposes within the United States. FISA, enacted in 1978 after revelations of
widespread spying on Americans by federal law enforcement and intelligent
agencies — including the NSA — struck a careful balance between protecting civil
liberties and preserving the ‘vitally important government purpose’ of obtaining
valuable intelligence to safeguard national security.” (footnotes omitted)).
195
50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
196
Id. § 1803 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
197
In pertinent part, § 1805(a) provides that:
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demonstrates that “there is probable cause to believe that . . . the
target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power,” the FISA court must issue the warrant on these facts
alone.198 An American citizen or a lawful resident of the United States
(a “United States person” in FISA terminology) will be considered “an
agent of a foreign power” if he “knowingly engages in clandestine
intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf of a foreign power”
which involve violation of the criminal laws of the United States.199
There is general agreement that FISA’s probable cause standard is
easier to satisfy than the probable cause standard employed under
Title III and the Fourth Amendment.200

[T]he judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested or as modified
approving the electronic surveillance if he finds that —
(1) the President has authorized the Attorney General to approve
applications for electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
information;
(2) the application has been made by a Federal officer and approved by
the Attorney General;
(3) on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant there is probable
cause to believe that —
(A) the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power: . . . ; and
(B) each of the facilities or places at which the electronic
surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(4) the proposed minimization procedures meet the definition of
minimization procedures under [FISA]; and
(5) the application which has been filed contains all statements and
certifications required by [FISA] and, if the target is a United States
person, the certification or certifications are not clearly erroneous . . . .
Id. § 1805(a) (emphasis added). As noted, if these statutory criteria are satisfied, the
FISA court must issue the warrant. Although FISA court judges have no discretion to
deny a warrant and the process “may appear to present a rubber stamp procedure, the
purpose is to assure written accountability within the executive branch for the
decision to engage in electronic surveillance, thus providing an internal check against
arbitrariness.” Bloom & Dunn, supra note 191, at 163 n.136 (citations omitted).
198
50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (2000). FISA defines “foreign agent” to include persons
engaged in international terrorism, id. § 1801(b)(1)(C)-(2)(C) (2000 & Supp. IV
2004), and defines “foreign power” to include “a group engaged in international
terrorism or activities in preparation therefore.” Id. § 1801(a)(4) (2000).
199
Id. § 1801(b)(2)(A)-(E).
200
See, e.g., Bloom & Dunn, supra note 191, at 163-64 (asserting that probable
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Additionally, FISA allows for warrantless surveillance during
emergencies. Where government officials do not have the time to
obtain a FISA warrant, the Attorney General may approve warrantless
surveillance prior to requesting a warrant from the FISC, provided a
subsequent request is made to the FISA court within seventy-two
hours of the implementation of the warrantless surveillance.201 FISA’s
scope also extends to wartime. The statute permits the Attorney
General to approve warrantless surveillance for the first fifteen days
following a declaration of war.202
Another unambiguous aspect of the statute was Congress’s intention
that FISA “shall be the exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance . . . and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and
electronic communications may be conducted” in the United States.203
To underline its intent on this matter, Congress repealed § 2511(3),
which had provided that “nothing . . . shall limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to
protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile
acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information
deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect

cause standard under FISA is not as strict as under Title III and Fourth Amendment);
Sims, supra note 32, at 110 (noting that FISA’s probable cause test is “uniformly
agreed to be a standard that is easier to meet than the Title III standard”); id. at 120
n.53 (noting that “essence of FISA legislative compromise was to give the government
a way to obtain a warrant for electronic surveillance that did not require meeting the
probable cause standard applied in ordinary criminal cases”). Bloom and Dunn have
explained:
[T]he standard for probable cause in the FISA context is not as strict as for
general crime control. FISA does not require a finding that a crime is
imminent or that the elements of a specific crime exist, but it requires
instead a more speculative standard that allows surveillance to occur at an
earlier stage in the investigative process. This speculative standard is
evidenced in the agency-based definition for an “agent of a foreign power.” .
. . In addition, the FISC judge must make this determination based upon the
facts and circumstances provided by the executive branch. The probable
cause requirement, therefore, defers greatly to the executive branch to allow
it to determine when probable cause exists and then to provide the FISC
judge only limited discretion to challenge such a determination.
Bloom & Dunn, supra note 191, at 164 (footnotes omitted).
201
50 U.S.C. § 1805(f)(2) (2000).
202
Id. § 1811 (2000). A congressional report explained that this 15 day window
for warrantless surveillance “allow[s] time for consideration of any amendment to
[FISA] that may be appropriate during a wartime emergency.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-1720,
at 34 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4063.
203
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (Supp. IV 2004).
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national security information against foreign intelligence activities.”204
Thus, by repealing § 2511(3) and designating FISA and its related
provisions as the “exclusive means” for conducting electronic
surveillance within the country, Congress unmistakably signaled its
understanding that, assuming the President had the inherent power to
conduct warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
matters prior to FISA’s enactment, he no longer had the authority to
conduct such surveillance in contravention of federal law.205 In fact,
as several of the briefs in ACLU v. NSA pointed out, “FISA’s legislative
history provides further confirmation that Congress’s dual purpose in
enacting FISA was (1) to ‘provide a legislative authorization for . . .
electronic surveillance conducted within the United States for foreign
intelligence purposes,’ and (2) to ‘moot the debate over the existence
or non-existence’ of ‘any Presidential power to authorize warrantless
surveillances in the United States.’”206
204
Id. § 2511(3) (1976) (repealed 1978); see also S. REP. NO. 95-604(I) (1977), as
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3908 (discussing reasons for repealing §
2511(3)).
205
See Nolan et al., supra note 176, at 43. In a letter to Congress, a group of
constitutional scholars and former government officials wrote:

We do not dispute that, absent congressional action, the President might
have inherent constitutional authority to collect “signals intelligence” about
the enemy abroad. Nor do we dispute that, had Congress taken no action in
this area, the President might well be constitutionally empowered to conduct
domestic surveillance directly tied and narrowly confined to that goal —
subject, of course, to Fourth Amendment limits. . . . But FISA specifically
repealed [§ 2511 (3)] and replaced it with language dictating that FISA and
the criminal code are the “exclusive means” of conducting electronic
surveillance. In doing so, Congress did not deny that the President has
constitutional power to conduct electronic surveillance for national security
purposes; rather, Congress properly concluded that “even if the President
has the inherent authority in the absence of legislation to authorize
warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes,
Congress has the power to regulate the conduct of such surveillance by
legislating a reasonable procedure, which then becomes the exclusive means
by which such surveillance may be conducted.”
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 24 (1978)).
206
Brief of Center for National Security Studies and the Constitution Project as
Amici Curiae at 8, ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-2095 & 062140) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 24 (1978)) (alteration in original); see
also Brief for the Appellees, supra note 178, at 23 n.36 (explaining that House
Conference Report “also makes clear that Congress intended FISA and Title III to
extinguish (with limited exceptions provided in those statutes) the President’s
authority to engage in warrantless surveillance”). The Appellees’ Brief further
contended that “[t]he conferees rejected language that would have described Title III
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Finally, FISA explicitly banned electronic surveillance within the
United States “except as authorized by statute.”207 Although FISA and
Title III provide the exclusive means for lawful electronic surveillance
inside the nation’s borders, it is important to understand that FISA
does not outlaw every type of electronic surveillance conducted by the
federal government. For example, “no warrant is [required under
FISA] if the target of the interception is a suspected terrorist overseas,
or if the acquisition is done on any basis other than ‘by intentionally
targeting’ a United States person.”208 Particularly relevant to an
analysis of the TSP, FISA defines “electronic surveillance” as follows:
[T]he acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio
communication sent by or intended to be received by a
particular, known United States person who is in the United
States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting
that United States person, under circumstances in which a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant
would be required for law enforcement purposes . . . .209
Under this definition of “electronic surveillance,” the NSA can
conduct warrantless surveillance of suspected terrorists located abroad
that captures the communications of American citizens, provided that
the surveillance does not intentionally target Americans or lawful
residents of the United States inside the country. Indeed, under this
definition “[n]o FISA warrant would be required even if the United
States person were within the United States, unless the interception
targeted the United States person.”210

and FISA as the ‘exclusive statutory means’ by which electronic surveillance could be
conducted, instead adopting language that makes those statutes ‘the exclusive
means.’” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1720, at 35 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4064).
207
50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) (2000).
208
Sims, supra note 32, at 127 n.69.
209
50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
210
Sims, supra note 32, at 122; see also id. at 127 (“FISA does not flatly prevent
NSA from intercepting, processing, analyzing and distributing international
communications by, from, or about United States persons in the United States. . . .
When interception takes place outside the United States, FISA regulates the targeting
of communications to or from a particular United States person in the United States.”
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
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C. The Bush Administration’s Argument Supporting Warrantless Foreign
Surveillance
The Bush Administration has conceded that the TSP does not
comply with FISA’s requirements.211 But this concession, according to
the Administration, does not mean that the TSP violates the Fourth
Amendment. Compliance with FISA is not required, according to the
government, because the President “has inherent constitutional
authority, notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment, to conduct
warrantless surveillance of communications involving foreign powers
such as al Qaeda and its agents.”212 While Keith had no reason to
address the point, the government’s brief observed that every court of
appeals to address the issue since then has ruled that the President has
inherent authority under the Constitution, “not trumped by the
Fourth Amendment,” to employ warrantless surveillance to gather
foreign intelligence information.213
Shifting ground slightly by
acknowledging that the Fourth Amendment does control the
President’s conduct, the government has also stated that “[a]lthough
no warrant is required [for foreign intelligence searches], the Fourth
Amendment requires that all searches be reasonable.”214
But,
according to the government, “[u]nder the foreign intelligence
doctrine, searches are reasonable as long as they are conducted to
secure foreign intelligence information.”215
Alternatively, the Administration contends that even if the TSP is
subject to conventional Fourth Amendment doctrine, it is consistent
with the special needs exception to the warrant requirement because
“its purpose is to detect and prevent further terrorist attacks by foreign
agents from within the United States.”216 Under the special needs
doctrine, government officials are permitted to conduct searches and
seizures without any suspicion of criminality.
Although

211
See Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, and General Michael Hayden, Principal
Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Press Briefing (Dec. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html
(providing
statement by General Hayden: “Yes, because the speed, because of the procedures,
because of the processes and requirements set up in the FISA process, I can say
unequivocally that we used [the TSP] in lieu of [FISA] and [the TSP] has been
successful”); cf. Yoo, supra note 24, at 565 (describing that TSP “surveillance took
place outside the framework” of FISA).
212
Brief of Appellants, supra note 24, at 34-35.
213
Id. at 35.
214
Id. at 36.
215
Id.
216
Id. at 37.
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individualized suspicion and judicial warrants are generally required
when the government intrudes into the privacy of citizens, the Court
has recognized an exception to the probable cause and warrant
requirements “when ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable.’”217
According to the government’s interpretation of the special needs
exception, “reasonableness is determined by conducting a ‘fact-specific
balancing’ of the Government interests underlying the search and the
associated intrusion into privacy interests.”218 Under the government’s
calculus, the information required for this type of balancing would
include “the nature of the al Qaeda threat; facts supporting the need
for speed and flexibility in conducting surveillance beyond that
traditionally available under FISA; details concerning TSP’s targeting
decisions, its effectiveness in detecting and preventing terrorist
attacks, and other operation information; and other specifics
concerning the scope and nature of TSP surveillance.”219 The
government insists, however, that the state secrets privilege precludes
that type of fact-specific inquiry.
In sum, the Bush Administration has defended the President’s
authority to employ electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence in
its broadest form. Essentially, the Bush Administration has taken the
position that the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by the Court,
does not apply to the President when he authorizes electronic
surveillance of communications that involve foreign powers or that
relate to the activities of foreign terrorists such as al Qaeda and its
supporters. It does not matter that TSP surveillance also intercepts the
words or writings of American citizens while located inside the
nation’s borders. According to the Bush Administration, neither FISA
nor the conventional warrant requirement applies to the TSP.
D. Under Keith’s Mode of Analysis, Warrantless Foreign Surveillance Is
Unconstitutional
When determining whether the President has the inherent power to
conduct warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence, it
is important that the issue be carefully framed and analyzed. Also, to
the extent that precedent matters, it is equally important to recall how
217
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
218
Brief of Appellants, supra note 24, at 37-38 (citations omitted).
219
Id. at 38.
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the analogous issue in Keith — whether the President has the inherent
power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance for domestic
intelligence — was analyzed by the Court.
The Bush Administration characterizes the searches undertaken by
the TSP as involving the foreign affairs power of the President.
Therefore, the argument proceeds, the “foreign intelligence doctrine”
not only eliminates the warrant requirement, but also resolves the
constitutional question because “[u]nder the foreign intelligence
doctrine, searches are reasonable as long as they are conducted to
secure foreign intelligence information.”220 Without addressing the
circular reasoning of this argument, the government’s position is the
equivalent of asserting that the Fourth Amendment does not control
the President when he authorizes searches for foreign intelligence
information.221 Certainly, the TSP relates to foreign affairs or involves
foreign powers. But that fact does not end the constitutional inquiry,
especially when the TSP monitors the communications of American
citizens within the nation’s borders. As Judge Malcolm Wilkey has
explained:
No matter how certain [the President’s] constitutional
mandate in this or any other area, the President is never free to
act in complete disregard of the protection guaranteed each
individual by the Bill of Rights. If his foreign affairs authority
affords the Executive department an exemption from the
requirement of prior judicial approval, it is not because the
President can ignore constitutional safeguards in the
performance of his duties; rather, it is because, on balance, the
exigencies of foreign intelligence gathering outweigh the
constitutional value placed on prior judicial approval.222

220

Id. at 36.
Whether for strategic reasons or otherwise, the government’s briefs in ACLU v.
NSA never directly state that the Fourth Amendment does not control or apply to the
President. Notwithstanding the subtle nature of the government’s most recent filings,
other scholars have interpreted the Bush Administration’s legal arguments as the
equivalent of arguing that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the President.
See, e.g., Cole, supra note 33, at 18 (noting that in “memorandum to Congress, the
Bush Administration argued that the Commander-in-Chief may not be restricted in his
choice of the ‘means and methods of engaging the enemy,’ and that President Bush is
therefore free to wiretap Americans without court approval in the ‘war on terror’ even
though Congress has made it a crime to do so” (footnote omitted)).
222
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Wilkey, J.,
concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
221
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Thus, in resolving the question whether the President has the power
to order warrantless surveillance, it is not enough to assert that TSP
interceptions target foreign powers. That fact only begins the inquiry,
unless, of course, the Fourth Amendment does not apply when the
President authorizes searches in this country involving foreign affairs.
The Supreme Court has never held that the President is free to ignore
the Bill of Rights whenever Executive Branch functions concern
foreign affairs. Moreover, its rulings in recent cases raising analogous
issues indicate that it is unlikely to take this position.223
223
Although space limitations preclude an extended discussion, even a cursory
look at the Court’s prior rulings recognize that the President’s inherent powers under
Article II of the Constitution does not permit him to run roughshod over federal law
or the Bill of Rights. For example, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952), President Harry S. Truman issued an order directing the Secretary of
Commerce to take temporary possession of and operation over most of the nation’s
steel mills in order to avert a potential threat to national security. The Court rejected
the argument that the President acted within his constitutional powers to avert a
stoppage of steel production needed for weapons and other material during the
Korean War. As Professor Laurence Tribe has noted, if the President does not have
the inherent authority to temporarily remove the owners of the nation’s largest steel
mills during a war, “without confiscating, transferring, or otherwise touching the
property’s ultimate ownership,” it is hard to understand why the President has the
inherent authority to conduct discretionary, and apparently never-ending, electronic
surveillance targeting the communications of citizens located in this country. Letter
from Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard University, to Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
3 (Jan. 6, 2006) (on file with author).
Nor does the Court’s recent ruling in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004),
which construed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), Pub. L.
No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), to permit detention of American citizens captured
aboard while fighting American forces, support the Bush Administration’s legal
arguments regarding the TSP. According to the government, if the AUMF authorizes
detention of Americans as an incident of war, then certainly the Bush Administration
can take the lesser step of listening to the communications of citizens suspected of
having ties to al Qaeda. But this argument makes no sense once one examines the
scope of Hamdi’s holding. The Hamdi plurality explicitly limited its holding to
individuals who were “part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States . . . in
Afghanistan and who engaged in an armed conflict against the United States there.”
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted). Hamdi, as Tribe
explained, stands for the unexceptional point that statutory authorization to kill or
shoot an enemy on the battlefield impliedly authorizes the military to take the less
drastic step of detaining that enemy for the duration of the war. Tribe, supra, at 4-5.
The power to conduct discretionary electronic surveillance against Americans, which
the TSP allows, “is by no stretch of the legal imagination a ‘lesser included power’
contained within the power to repel future terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda on the United
States.” Id. at 5; see also Nolan et al., supra note 176, at 43 (“It is one thing, however,
to say that foreign battlefield capture of enemy combatants is an incident of waging
war that Congress intended to authorize. It is another matter entirely to treat
unchecked warrantless domestic spying as included in that authorization, especially
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Regarding precedent, the Bush Administration notes that Keith
expressly reserved the question whether the President possesses
inherent authority, “notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment,” to
authorize warrantless surveillance for foreign intelligence.224 While
this is certainly true, it is equally accurate that “Fourth Amendment
analysis must begin with the recognition that the Supreme Court has
never upheld warrantless wiretapping within the United States, for any
purpose.”225 Also, it is obvious that the surveillance conducted by the
TSP is factually distinguishable from the surveillance in Keith because
it involves foreign intelligence. “[B]ut the problem remains whether
the situations are constitutionally different.”226 If precedent matters,
where an existing statute specifies that other laws are the ‘exclusive means’ by which
electronic surveillance may be conducted and provides that even a declaration of war
authorizes such spying only for a fifteen-day emergency period.”). Indeed, the Hamdi
plurality stated that “indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation” of enemy
combatants “is not authorized” by the AUMF. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521. “It follows a
fortiori that indefinite subjection of American citizens who are not even alleged to be
enemies, much less enemy combatants, to ongoing invasions of their privacy in the
United States for purposes of obtaining valuable information is not authorized either.”
Tribe, supra, at 5.
Finally, and probably most importantly, the Hamdi plurality indicated that it was
not persuaded by the Bush Administration’s argument that the judiciary had no role to
play when determining what amount of due process is guaranteed to an American
citizen detained by the military as an enemy combatant. After holding that “a citizendetainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive
notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the
Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker,” 542 U.S. at 533
(citation omitted), the Hamdi plurality continued:
[W]e necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that separation of powers
principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such
circumstances. Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo any
examination of the individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of
the broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of
separation of powers, as this approach serves only to condense power into a
single branch of government. We have long since made clear that a state of
war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the
Nation’s citizens.
Id. at 535-36 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 587). If the War on
Terror does not provide the President “a blank check” to determine for himself the
due process rights of Americans detained and classified as enemy combatants, that
same “war” does not provide the President the power to determine by himself whether
warrantless electronic surveillance of the communications of Americans is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.
224
Brief of Appellants, supra note 24, at 34-35.
225
Cole, supra note 33, at 18.
226
Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 700 (Wilkey, J., concurring and dissenting).
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“[t]hat question can only be answered by the same kind of balancing
process the Supreme Court used in Keith.”227
The type of analysis employed in Keith was categorical, not a factspecific, totality-of-the-circumstances approach.228 Keith analyzed the
issue of whether the President had inherent power to order domestic
security wiretaps “from the perspective of whether it is reasonable to
except from the warrant procedure the category of cases involving that
power, rather than whether it was reasonable to conduct a surveillance
(with or without a warrant) under the particular circumstances
involved in th[e] case.”229 Keith built on Camara’s formula for
determining whether the warrant requirement governs domestic
security wiretaps.230 Keith explained:
If the legitimate need of Government to safeguard domestic
security requires the use of electronic surveillance, the
question is whether the needs of citizens for privacy and free
expression may not be better protected by requiring a warrant
before such surveillance is undertaken. We must also ask
whether a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the
efforts of Government to protect itself from acts of subversion
and overthrow directed against it.231
If the TSP is to survive constitutional scrutiny under the two-prong
standard announced in Keith, the government will have to show that
judicial approval for foreign intelligence searches is unnecessary to
protect the privacy and free speech interests of citizens, and that “a
warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the efforts of
227

Id.
See supra Part II.
229
Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 629 n.89 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). After
noting that the government defendants “cite Keith for the proposition that the Fourth
Amendment is flexible, requiring that courts ‘examine the then competing
circumstances and balance the basic values at stake,’” the Zweibon plurality then
explained:
228

However, the Keith Court made it clear that the factors to be balanced were
those values implicated by the category of cases of which Keith was but one
example — the duty of the Government to protect the domestic security and
the invasion of individual privacy and free expression that might result from
abuse of warrantless surveillance. What the Court did not do was weigh the
reasonableness of installing a wiretap under the specific circumstances of that
case, where the subject of the wiretap had allegedly bombed a CIA office.
Id. at 630 n.91 (citations, brackets, and ellipsis omitted).
230
See supra Part II.
231
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972).
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Government” to deter or identify future terrorism against the United
States or its interests.232 Under Keith’s first prong, a court must
initially decide whether “the needs of citizens for privacy and free
expression may not be better protected by requiring a warrant” before
foreign intelligence surveillance is undertaken.233 There are at least
two good reasons why the warrant requirement should apply to the
TSP notwithstanding the fact that the searches involve foreign
intelligence. First, foreign intelligence surveillance is subject to the
same type of political abuse that prompted Keith to conclude that the
warrant requirement controls national security wiretaps. Second, the
scope of the “inherent power” argument proffered by the Bush
Administration is not confined to the intrusions originally
contemplated under the TSP. This power is limitless and will
overwhelm the Fourth Amendment rights of any person — citizen or
non-citizen — on the mere order of the President.
The government insists that the President and Executive Branch
officers have discretion to conduct electronic surveillance for “foreign
intelligence information,”234 but “[l]ittle reflection is required to
recognize that this is an extremely broad exemption whose
employment by the Executive might be subject to inordinate abuse.”235
Similar to the concepts of “foreign security,” “foreign affairs,” “related
to the conduct of foreign relations,” and “involving a foreign power,”
the concept of “foreign intelligence information” is a vague and
malleable standard.236 As was true in the 1970s, so it is true today that
“given the way in which almost any activity can be said to relate, at
least remotely, to foreign affairs or foreign policy making, the potential
scope of [a foreign intelligence information] exemption to the warrant
requirement is boundless, and thus a substantial danger to the values

232

Id.
Id.; see also Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 632-33 (plurality opinion) (explaining that
Keith’s analysis requires court to “determine whether a warrant requirement will better
protect Fourth Amendment rights when foreign intelligence gathering is involved, and
whether such a requirement would unduly fetter the legitimate functioning of the
Government”). According to the court, “unless there are valid reasons for abrogating
the warrant procedure when foreign relations are implicated, the President must
comply with that traditional procedure.” Id. at 633.
234
Brief of Appellants, supra note 24, at 36.
235
Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 701 (Wilkey, J., concurring and dissenting).
236
See id.; cf. Note, Foreign Security Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 87
HARV. L. REV. 976, 977 (1974) (commenting that “[a]lmost any problem of
governmental concern could be said to relate, at least remotely, to the national
security, and to bear, at least potentially, on the country’s relations with foreign
powers”).
233
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the Fourth Amendment was fashioned to protect.”237 The concerns
Judge Wilkey articulated a quarter century ago about the Nixon
Administration’s assertion of power to conduct “foreign affairs”
searches equally apply to the “foreign intelligence doctrine” asserted
by the Bush Administration:
Virtually every political action in this country has some
international repercussions. Certainly all protests against this
country’s foreign policy, as well as protests against the
international or foreign policy of another country . . . would
have to be included. Every group, to mention only one
example, which actively protested this country’s involvement
in the [Iraq] war [or the government’s Middle East policy]
could have been subjected to a warrantless wiretap under the
exemption proposed by the Government . . . . “Related to the
conduct of foreign relations” and “involving a foreign power”
are also extremely malleable criteria. Their utilization as
standards for permitting warrantless surveillance activities
would pose not only grave Fourth Amendment problems but
also would threaten important First Amendment values.238
Moreover, if the Bush Administration’s legal position is sound, the
President’s inherent power to authorize warrantless searches is not
confined to contexts where one party to a telephone conversation or
email message is located outside the country and is suspected of
having ties to al Qaeda. Under the “inherent power” argument, the
President can authorize surveillance of purely domestic
communications between American citizens or persons lawfully
residing in the country, provided “the communication has some link
(however indirect) with terrorism (however the President defines
it).”239 Further, the scope of the “inherent power” argument extends
237

Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 654 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 701 (Wilkey, J., concurring and dissenting).
239
See Brief of Center for National Security Studies, supra note 206, at 19-20
(explaining that the “inherent power” argument is “limitless in scope”).
238

Although the Administration has asserted that it has limited the secret NSA
program only to communications where one party is abroad, and only where
there is a basis to believe there is a link to a particular terrorist group (al
Qaeda), its claimed “inherent authority” is not so limited. Because it depends
on the President’s unreviewable assertion that a duly-enacted statute impedes
efforts to combat international terrorism — even where the statute seeks to
protect Americans in this country — the authority would permit him to
conduct surveillance of domestic communications based merely on an NSA
operative’s determination that the communication has some link (however
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beyond electronic surveillance. It also includes the power to forcibly
enter and search private homes. Indeed, several Presidents have
asserted the authority to forcibly enter a citizen’s home without
judicial approval to search for items related to foreign espionage or
intelligence.240 Finally, the President’s power is “potentially infinite”
when one considers the likelihood that the War on Terror will
continue for the foreseeable future.241 In sum, taking account of these
concerns, a court could reasonably conclude that “the needs of
citizens for privacy and free expression [will] be better protected by
requiring a warrant” before foreign intelligence surveillance is
commenced.242
The second prong of Keith’s analysis requires determining whether a
warrant requirement would unduly frustrate government efforts to
detect or deter potential acts of foreign terrorism directed against the
United States or its interests. In defending the TSP, the government
has never directly addressed this point. It does suggest, however, that
there are circumstances where intelligence officers lack “the speed and

indirect) with terrorism (however the President defines it).
Id.; cf. Nolan et al., supra note 176, at 44 (“According to Attorney General Gonzales,
the NSA may wiretap any person in the United States who so much as receives a
communication from anyone abroad, if the administration deems either of the parties
to be affiliated with al-Qaeda, a member of an organization affiliated with al-Qaeda,
‘working in support of al Qaeda,’ or ‘part of’ an organization or group ‘that is
supportive of al Qaeda.’ Under this reasoning, a US citizen living here who received a
phone call from another US citizen who attends a mosque that the administration
believes is ‘supportive’ of al-Qaeda could be wiretapped without a warrant.”).
240
E.g., Ronald J. Ostrow, U.S. Reasserts Warrantless Search Rights, WASH. POST,
May 19, 1975, at A2 (“The Ford Administration has reasserted that federal agents have
the right to break into a citizen’s home without a warrant and to search for items that
might be used in foreign espionage or intelligence cases.”); R. Jeffrey Smith,
Administration Backing No-Warrant Spy Searches, WASH. POST, July 15, 1994, at A19
(detailing President Clinton’s assertion of inherent authority to conduct warrantless
searches, including homes of U.S. citizens, for foreign intelligence purposes); Edward
Walsh, Carter Centralizes U.S. Intelligence Authority, Draws Fire, WASH. POST, Jan. 25,
1978, at A2. See generally Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 194 (describing and
approving constitutional justifications and Executive Branch orders authorizing
warrantless physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes). For a critique of the
President’s authority to conduct warrantless physical searches for foreign intelligence
purposes, see Eggert, supra note 193, at 643.
241
Brief of Center for National Security Studies and the Constitution Project as
Amici Curiae, supra note 206, at 19 (arguing that President’s “authority is potentially
infinite because there is no foreseeable end to the present campaign against
terrorism”).
242
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972).
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the agility” to detect potential terrorist activity.243 Although the
government does not identify or emphasize any single factor as
justification for bypassing the warrant process, certainly the need for
speed is a legitimate concern, without which important government
interests might be defeated. The problem with this claim is that
Congress has already accommodated this vital government interest in
FISA. The statute provides for “emergency situation[s]” that allow
warrantless electronic surveillance in cases where officials do not have
time to obtain a FISA warrant.244 Under FISA, the Attorney General
can authorize emergency surveillance before seeking a FISA warrant,
provided a later request for such a warrant is undertaken within
seventy-two hours of the start of the warrantless surveillance.245
Similarly, conventional search and seizure law permits immediate
searches where exigent circumstances make it impractical to seek
judicial approval prior to searching. Thus, the government’s need for
speed and flexibility to identify and track potential terrorist activity,
while undoubtedly an imperative interest, does not justify completely
exempting Executive Branch officers from the warrant requirement.246
243
See Gonzales, supra note 211 (“The operators out at NSA tell me that we don’t
have the speed and the agility that we need, in all circumstances, to deal with this new
kind of enemy. You have to remember that FISA was passed by the Congress in 1978.
There have been tremendous advances in technology . . . .”); see also Brief of
Appellants, supra note 24, at 38 (stating that state secrets privilege precludes type of
fact-specific analysis needed to evaluate reasonableness of TSP surveillance, including
“facts supporting the need for speed and flexibility in conducting surveillance beyond
that traditionally available under FISA”); Appellants’ Reply Brief and Cross-Appellees’
Responsive Brief at 45, ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-2095 &
No. 06-2140) [hereinafter NSA Reply Brief] (“The President and his top advisors have
determined that the current threat to the United States demands that signals
intelligence be carried out with a speed and methodology that cannot be achieved by
seeking judicial approval through the traditional FISA process. While plaintiffs may
take issue with the President’s assessment, his judgment is well supported by the facts,
including facts concerning the nature of the al Qaeda threat, the activities the
President has directed, and the superiority of those activities to traditional FISAauthorized surveillance.”); Yoo, supra note 24, at 576 (stating that “FISA imposes slow
and cumbersome procedures on our intelligence and law enforcement officers”).
244
50 U.S.C. § 1805(f)(1) (2000).
245
Id. § 1805(f)(2).
246
While acknowledging FISA’s allowance of emergency searches, Professor Yoo
writes that this provision does not satisfy the government’s needs because “the
Attorney General [cannot] use the emergency procedure if the probable cause
standard [is] not met.” Yoo, supra note 24, at 577 (footnote omitted). When
considering this concern, it is helpful to keep in mind that under the Fourth
Amendment, probable cause is not a particularly vigorous standard. Probable cause
does not require a more-likely-than-not showing of guilt, or even compliance with a
preponderance of the evidence standard. Rather, “probable cause requires only a
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While the government’s concerns about speed and exigency are
answered by FISA’s allowance of emergency warrants and the Fourth
Amendment’s exigency exception, there may be other aspects of
foreign intelligence searches that might unduly frustrate the
government’s interests if judicial warrants are required before such
searches are permitted. For example, it has often been said that judges
lack the competence, experience, and analytical acumen to evaluate
foreign security threats identified by the government.247 Similar
concerns were raised in Keith.248 Tellingly, the Bush Administration
did not raise this concern in ACLU v. NSA. Perhaps, that is because
the government’s experience with FISA’s warrant process has shown
that judges on the FISC almost never deny an application for a
surveillance warrant. The government’s statistics for 2005 show that
2,074 warrant applications were presented to the FISC to conduct
electronic surveillance, or conduct forcible entries or both. “Two
applications were withdrawn before they were ruled on; 2,072
applications were granted, with 61 of those having been the subject of
substantive modifications by the court; no application was denied in
whole or part.”249 The overwhelmingly large percentage of warrant
applications approved by the FISC in 2005 is not unusual. Annual
reports released by the Justice Department indicate that FISA’s warrant
process has not undermined the government’s ability to obtain
electronic surveillance warrants. According to government statistics,
probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such
activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13 (1983). Thus, the emergency
procedure of FISA is insufficient not because it does not recognize and accommodate
the government’s need for speed and the ability to react to exigent circumstances, but
instead because it does not allow the government to conduct suspicionless searches of
Americans. See infra notes 271-87 and accompanying text.
247
See Note, supra note 236, at 983-84 (describing various “judicial competence”
arguments, which include: (1) “because of a relative lack of judicial competence in
judging the reasonableness of foreign security surveillance, the likelihood of judicial
error prejudicial to the Government is particularly great”; (2) “erroneous judicial
prevention of surveillance will be particularly costly in this area because of the greater
importance of the surveillances themselves”; and (3) “there are no ‘manageable
standards’ for evaluating an international peril, and in that sense the question of
whether such a peril justifies surveillance is arguably ‘nonjusticiable’”).
248
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 319 (1972) (“The
Government further insists that courts ‘as a practical matter would have neither the
knowledge nor the techniques necessary to determine whether there was probable
cause to believe that surveillance was necessary to protect national security.’”).
249
Sims, supra note 32, at 111 n.27 (citation omitted). For the report of 2006
statistics, see Letter to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives,
from Richard A. Hertling, Acting Assistant U.S. Attorney General (Apr. 27, 2007),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2006rept.pdf.
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there have been nearly 19,000 surveillance applications to the FISC
since 1978. “The FISC denied only four of these applications; granted
approximately 180 applications with modifications; and granted the
remaining 18,451 without modifications.”250 As predicted many years
ago, what these statistics show is that federal judges are unlikely to
deny requests from Executive Branch officials seeking foreign
intelligence warrants.251
In addition to the concerns about speed and judicial competence,
another concern that has been raised against subjecting foreign
intelligence searches to the judicial process is the need to avoid
interference with the President’s constitutional duty to protect the
nation against foreign security threats. The Bush Administration
reiterates this theme when it asserts that “the President’s most basic
constitutional duty is to protect the Nation against armed attack,” and
notes that as Commander-in-Chief, the President’s powers “include

250
Brief for the Appellees, supra note 178, at 49-50 (citing OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y
GEN., FISA ANNUAL REPORTS TO CONGRESS 1979-2004, available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/agency/doj/fisa/#rept).
251
See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (commenting preFISA that “judges are likely to be highly deferential to the Executive’s determination
concerning need to install a wiretap, particularly where a judicial error might
substantially harm the national interest” (footnote omitted)); id. at 702 (Wilkey, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (noting pre-FISA that “judges are fully aware of the special
expertise the Executive department possesses in this area”). According to Judge
Wilkey, “[i]f there is error in a court’s decision, it is likely to stem from excessive
reliance on that expertise rather than too little respect for the Executive’s judgment.”
Id.; see also Note, supra note 236, at 984 (same). The text is not meant to suggest that
judges on the FISC act as a “rubber stamp” for the government. One possible reason
why surveillance applications are rarely denied is because the government lawyers in
charge of overseeing applications for FISA warrants carefully scrutinize those
applications to ensure that the applications comply with all of FISA’s requirements.
According to one former high-ranking government official:

FISA requires a lengthy review process, in which special FBI and
[Department of Justice] lawyers prepare an extensive package of facts and
law to present to the FISC. The Attorney General must personally sign the
application, and another high-ranking national security officer, such as the
President’s National Security Advisor or the Director of the FBI, must certify
that the information sought is for foreign intelligence. It takes time and a
great deal of work to prepare the warrant applications, which can run 100
pages long.
Yoo, supra note 24, 576 (footnote omitted). Thus, it is not surprising that the
government’s oversight process will remove applications that do not comply with
FISA’s strict standards. As a result, the applications that do reach the FISC are very
likely to survive the judges’ scrutiny.
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secretly gathering intelligence information about foreign enemies.”252
While the government rightly describes the President as being in
charge of the nation’s foreign affairs, and as the supreme commander
of the country’s armed forces, neither of these facts explains why a
warrant requirement for foreign intelligence searches would frustrate
the government’s legitimate interests. The argument is simply a
variation on the “inherent power” theme and, like the “inherent
power” argument, amounts to a claim that the Fourth Amendment
does not apply to the President when he (or an Executive Branch
officer) wants to invade the privacy of citizens in order to obtain
foreign intelligence. “[T]he certainty of the President’s authority in
[the field of foreign affairs and intelligence] cannot ipso facto justify
the abrogation of constitutionally protected individual rights.”253 Nor
does the long history of warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance
by successive Presidents prove that the warrant requirement would
defeat the government’s legitimate interests. A similar tradition
existed for national security wiretaps, but the Keith Court saw no
reason to view that presidential practice as justification for bypassing
the judicial process.254
In support of its position that the warrant requirement does not
apply to foreign intelligence searches, the government also emphasizes
that every court of appeals to consider the issue since Keith has upheld
the President’s inherent power to conduct warrantless surveillance
involving foreign intelligence matters, whether within or without the
country.255 But as the plaintiffs and their amici explain in ACLU v.
252

NSA Reply Brief, supra note 243, at 44 (citations omitted). The government’s
need for secrecy and the risk of disclosure have also been raised as concerns against
the warrant requirement. FISA, however, has addressed these concerns. 50 U.S.C. §§
1802(a)(3)-(4), 1805(c)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
253
Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 702 (Wilkey, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Note,
supra note 236, at 978 (explaining that President’s constitutional responsibilities as
Commander-in-Chief and head of foreign affairs does not provide basis for exempting
his actions from Fourth Amendment scrutiny). “Though such powers may exist
independently of express constitutional or legislative delegation to a greater extent
than do other executive powers, there is no support in the Constitution for the
proposition that the fourth amendment, ostensibly a general limitation on otherwise
legal governmental activity, applies any less fully to one set of powers than to
another.” Id.
254
Cf. Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 616 (plurality opinion) (“Keith merely treated the
similarly long-standing Executive practice of conducting surveillance ‘in cases vitally
affecting the domestic security’ as indicative of the unchallenged Executive power to
obtain intelligence information, not as determinative of the proper procedures to be
followed in so doing.” (footnote omitted)).
255
United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 912-17 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
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NSA, the justifications cited by these lower courts for recognizing a
foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement no longer
apply in a post-FISA world.256 For example, the Fourth Circuit relied
on the fact that federal district court judges lacked sufficient expertise
on foreign intelligence matters as a reason for not applying the
warrant requirement.257 Keith’s logic suggests that this concern is not
a valid basis for bypassing the warrant requirement. Moreover, the
alleged inability of judges to comprehend foreign security threats has
not actually prevented the government from obtaining foreign
intelligence warrants under FISA. In any event, Congress has directly
addressed this concern by providing a specialized court to handle
foreign intelligence surveillance requests.
Finally, in determining whether a warrant requirement for foreign
intelligence searches would unduly frustrate governmental interests, a
Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593,
602-06 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 425-26 (5th
Cir. 1973); Brief of Appellants, supra note 24, at 35, 45 (citing In re Sealed Case, 310
F.3d 717, 742 & n.26 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002)).
256
See also Cole, supra note 33, at 33 (noting that “apart from the dictum in In re
Sealed Case, all the cases that have recognized inherent presidential authority to conduct
foreign intelligence surveillance have addressed the president’s pre-FISA authority”).
The government’s reliance on In re Sealed Case is curious. It cites the case for the
proposition that the President has inherent authority, not trumped by the Fourth
Amendment, “‘to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence
information.’” Brief of Appellants, supra note 24, at 35 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 310
F.3d 717, 742 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002)). At issue in In re Sealed Case was the propriety of
certain restrictions accompanying an order authorizing electronic surveillance that the
FISC imposed. The restrictions were designed to erect a “wall” between intelligence
officials and law enforcement agencies within the Executive Branch. The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review held that the restrictions were neither
mandated by FISA or the Constitution. In the course of reaching that decision, in pure
dicta, the Court of Review noted that “[w]e take for granted that the President [has
inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence
information] and, assuming that is so FISA could not encroach on the President’s
constitutional power.” In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
Thus, because In re Sealed Case involved facts where the FISC had issued an order
permitting electronic surveillance, it is plain that it had no occasion to address, let alone
decide, the constitutionality of warrantless electronic surveillance of American citizens.
257
See, e.g., Troung, 629 F.2d at 913-14 (explaining that “the courts are
unschooled in diplomacy and military affairs, a mastery of which would be essential to
passing upon an executive branch request that a foreign intelligence wiretap be
authorized”). Because the Executive Branch is “constitutionally designated as the preeminent authority in foreign affairs,” . . . “the separation of powers requires us to
acknowledge the principal responsibility of the President for foreign affairs and
concomitantly for foreign intelligence surveillance.” Id. at 914; cf. Butenko, 494 F.2d
at 605 (“[I]ntelligence gathering is a clandestine and highly unstructured activity, and
the need for electronic surveillance often cannot be anticipated in advance.”).
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court may consider Congress’s judgment that warrants are necessary
to secure the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens and lawful
residents. In the past, the Supreme Court has been willing to consider
Congress’s determination that a particular type of search or seizure
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.258 If congressional
approval is relevant in determining the reasonableness of a challenged
search or seizure, then it also seems appropriate to weigh Congress’s
judgment that certain types of warrantless searches are unreasonable.
By enacting FISA, Congress determined “that court orders and other
procedural safeguards are necessary to insure that electronic
surveillance by the U.S. government within this country conforms to
the fundamental principles of the Fourth Amendment.”259 Fourth
Amendment concerns played a significant part in Congress’s thinking
when FISA was adopted,260 Congress acted well within its
constitutional powers by passing legislation designed to protect
Fourth Amendment liberties even when such legislation implicates
foreign affairs or foreign intelligence concerns.
More importantly, passage of FISA was not “an isolated or quixotic
judgment of the legislative branch,”261 but rather the result of years of
debate which produced a carefully structured program that
accommodates the government’s needs to conduct searches for foreign
intelligence information and also protects the Fourth Amendment
interests of Americans. A central component of Congress’s judgment
was that a neutral magistrate’s review was essential to ensure that

258
See, e.g., United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 591-93 (1983)
(holding that customs officials, acting pursuant to statute authorizing customs officers
to board vessel to examine manifest and other documents, did not violate Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1976) (holding
warrantless arrest authorized by federal statute constitutional under Fourth
Amendment because postal inspector had probable cause that crime had been
committed).
259
S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 9, 13 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3937,
3977-78, 3982; see also S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 5, 18 (1977), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3906, 3919.
260
As one of the amici curiae briefs in ACLU v. NSA noted, “concerns over the
constitutionality of domestic electronic surveillance were one motivation behind FISA.
In enacting FISA, Congress legislated in the shadow of the Fourth Amendment,
furnishing a ‘secure framework by which the executive branch may conduct legitimate
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes within the context of this
nation’s commitment to privacy and individual rights.’” Brief of Curtis A. Bradley et
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 29, ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th
Cir. 2007) (No. 06-2095 & No. 06-2140) (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 15, as
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3916).
261
Watson, 423 U.S. at 415-16.
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Executive Branch decisions to utilize electronic surveillance do not
violate the privacy rights of individuals.
In sum, the government’s claims that the warrant requirement does
not apply to the TSP are not persuasive. Specifically, even though
FISA requires judicial approval when the government employs
electronic surveillance that intentionally targets the communications
of citizens and lawful residents within the United States, the statute
also accommodates many of the government’s legitimate interests in
obtaining foreign intelligence. Indeed, “FISA is not as restrictive as is
sometimes assumed.”262 As Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has
acknowledged, FISA does not regulate the overseas communications
of foreign persons.263 Nor does FISA cover the interception or
monitoring of communications of American citizens which occur
outside the United States.264
Moreover, the NSA may conduct warrantless electronic surveillance
of the calls and email of a suspected terrorist living abroad even if
those communications are sent or received by an American citizen or
lawful resident in this country.265 FISA’s warrant requirement is
triggered only when governmental electronic surveillance
“intentionally target[s]” a United States person, or the acquisition of
protected communications “occurs in the United States,” or both the
262

Sims, supra note 32, at 127 n.69.
See Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency’s Surveillance
Authority: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 118 (2006)
(statement of Alberto Gonzales, Att’y Gen. of the United States) [hereinafter Wartime
Executive Power] (“As a general matter, if you’re talking about non-U.S. persons
outside the United States and, certainly, if the acquisition is outside the United States,
you don’t have to worry about FISA.”).
264
See Sims, supra note 32, at 120 n.55 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1) (2000 &
Supp. IV 2004) (defining “electronic surveillance” as the acquisition of
communications to or from “a particular, known United States person who is in the
United States”)) (“United States persons who are outside the United States were
explicitly excluded from the reach of FISA.”); Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazan
& Jennifer K. Elsea, Congressional Research Serv., on Presidential Authority to
Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence
Information 20 (Jan. 5, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/
m010506.pdf (“The legislative history of [FISA] suggests that some electronic
surveillance by the National Security Agency involving communications taking place
entirely overseas, even involving U.S. persons, was not intended to be covered.”
(footnote omitted)).
265
See Sims, supra note 32, at 127 n.69 (“FISA requires a warrant before
international electronic communications of United States persons within the United
States are targeted. What is often overlooked is that a warrant is not required when
those communications are acquired overseas through interception that targets
someone else.”).
263
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sender and all intended recipients of the contents of any radio
communication “are located within the United States.”266 Finally, if, as
the government claims is true under the TSP, there is “a reasonable
basis to conclude that one party to [a] communication is a member of
al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization
affiliated with al Qaeda or working in support of al Qaeda,” FISA
requires the judge to issue a warrant to monitor such
communications.267
266

See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1)-(3) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
See id. § 1805 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). The government has provided shifting
explanations on whether the “reasonable basis” standard used in the TSP is the
equivalent of the probable cause standard used in FISA or the Fourth Amendment.
For example, on January 23, 2006, General Michael Hayden, the director of the NSA
when the TSP began, suggested to reporters at the National Press Club that the TSP
did not utilize a probable cause standard. See General Michael V. Hayden, Principal
Deputy Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Address to the National Press Club, What American
Intelligence and Especially the NSA Have Been Doing to Defend the Nation (Jan. 23,
2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2006/01/hayden012306.html.
267

QUESTION: Just to clarify . . . what I’ve heard you say today and an earlier
press conference, the change from going around the FISA law was to — one
of them was to lower the standard from what they call for, which is basically
probable cause to a reasonable basis . . . .
GEN. HAYDEN: You got most of it right. . . .
QUESTION: The question I was asking, though, was since you lowered the
standard, doesn’t that decrease the protections of the U.S. citizens? . . .
GEN. HAYDEN: I think you’ve accurately described the criteria under
which this operates, and I think I at least tried to accurately describe a
changed circumstance, threat to the nation, and why this approach —
limited, focused — has been effective.
Id.
Later, however, Attorney General Gonzales told the Senate Judiciary Committee
that the reasonable basis or reasonable grounds standard of the TSP is the same as
probable cause. See Wartime Executive Power, supra note 263, at 99-100 (“The
standard is a probable cause standard. . . . I think it is probable cause. But it is not
probable cause as to guilt. . . . or probable cause as to a crime being committed. It is
probable cause that a party to the communication is a member or agent of Al
Qaeda . . . . [T]he standards are the same in terms of probable cause.”).
Attorney General Gonzales’s comments are consistent with the written explanation
given by Assistant Attorney General William E. Moschella to Congressman James
Sesenbrenner, Jr., Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary. See Letter
from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to The
Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary 7 (Mar.
24, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj032406.pdf (“The
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ standard [of the TSP] is a ‘probable cause’ standard of
proof . . . and ‘probable cause’ is the standard employed under FISA for approving
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E. The Government’s Need for Suspicionless Searches
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that FISA facilitates the
issuance of a warrant for electronic surveillance. Why then has the
Bush Administration refused to comply with FISA? Professor John
Cary Sims has proffered two possibilities: One, the probable cause test
under the TSP “is easier to meet than the one that would be applied by
the FISC.”268 Or, two, the government lacks the resources to prepare
the many warrant applications that would be needed to comply with
FISA, and the delays and risks associated with the FISA process are
unacceptable.269 The second possibility, according to Sims, is not a
valid basis for ignoring FISA because the Executive Branch “can exert
substantial influence on the speed of the FISA process” through its
own internal procedures and resource allocation decisions.270 Besides,
if more attorneys or FISC judges are needed to process additional
warrant applications, it is unimaginable that Congress would not
provide the funding to handle the expanded workload.
The first explanation offered by Sims for the government’s refusal to
comply with FISA — a standard less stringent than FISA’s probable
cause test being used under the TSP — is more intriguing. He notes
that if the number of United States persons being targeted under the
TSP “has increased dramatically, that would strongly suggest that a
lower standard of probable cause is being used.”271 Also, if the TSP
targets persons inside the United States “based on ambiguous contacts
with suspected al Qaeda members,” Sims believes that the probable
cause test being employed “is not as demanding as the one that would
be applied by the FISC.”272 Sims, however, has hesitated to offer a
applications for electronic surveillance.” (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366,
371 (2003))).
268
Sims, supra note 32, at 127.
269
Id. at 127.
270
Id. at 139.
271
Id. at 138.
272
Id. at 139. Professor Sims states that the facts in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85
(1979), “may more closely resemble the circumstances of United States persons who
have some contact with an al Qaeda adherent without manifesting membership in or
allegiance to the group.” Sims, supra note 32, at 138-39. As Professor Sims explains,
Ybarra held that a warrant to search a tavern and its bartender for drugs did not
authorize a frisk of the patrons of the tavern who were present when the warrant was
executed. I certainly agree with Professor Sims’s implied conclusion that Ybarra
rejects the notion that mere proximity to others suspected of criminal activity is
sufficient proof of probable cause because every individual is “clothed with [their
own] constitutional protection” under the Fourth Amendment. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at
91. An argument can be made, however, that Maryland v. Pringle has undercut much
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definitive statement about the legality of the TSP because “[n]ot
enough is publicly known about the [scope and mechanics of the]
program to permit a full exploration of the constitutional assertions
being made by the [Bush] Administration.”273
I share Sims’s judgment that it is likely that the TSP conducts
searches that are inconsistent with FISA’s probable cause test.
Searches authorized by the TSP that do not meet FISA’s probable cause
standard undoubtedly violate the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause
rule. In analyzing this point, it is important to recall that FISA’s
probable cause test is not as strict as Title III’s or the Fourth
Amendment’s probable cause standard. “While Title III requires a
showing of probable cause that a proposed target has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit a crime, FISA requires a showing of
probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power.”274 Where a United States person is involved,
however, “an ‘agent of a foreign power’ is defined in terms of criminal
activity.”275 But even when a United States person is suspected of
engaging in clandestine intelligence activity, issuance of a FISA
warrant does not require the same level of probable cause that is
required for criminal cases. FISA defines clandestine intelligence
activities as conduct that “may involve” or “involve[s]” violation of
federal criminal statutes.276 By using such terms, “Congress clearly
intended a lesser showing of probable cause for these activities than
that applicable to ordinary criminal cases.”277
Although FISA calls for a lesser showing of probable cause, it still
requires some showing of clandestine intelligence activity or knowing
acts or plans for terrorism before Americans can be subjected to
electronic surveillance. And that’s the rub. The NSA can monitor and
intercept, without a FISA warrant, the overseas communications of a
person in Afghanistan or Pakistan who it suspects is a terrorist. The
government can also monitor the terrorist’s communications that
come into or leave the United States. But if that terrorist calls or

of Ybarra’s logic. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Pringle Case’s New Notion of Probable
Cause: An Assault on Di Re and the Fourth Amendment, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 395
(arguing that logic and result in Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), conflicts
with some of Court’s probable cause cases and weakens concept of individualized
probable cause).
273
Sims, supra note 32, at 137.
274
Memo from Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K. Elsea, supra note 264, at 18.
275
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 738 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (footnote omitted).
276
50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
277
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 738.
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emails someone in New York, can the government then target the
future telephone calls and emails of that New Yorker? If the content
of the communication between the terrorist and the New Yorker
indicates that the New Yorker may be involved in clandestine
intelligence activity or knowingly plotting sabotage or terrorism, a
FISA warrant can be obtained to target the New Yorker’s future
communications. But what if the content of that communication is
facially innocent? Officers at the NSA “might feel that the very fact
that the suspected terrorist called the [New Yorker] raises suspicions
about the [New Yorker], perhaps even strong ones.”278 Several calls or
emails between the terrorist and the New Yorker, “even if the contents
of the communications appear innocent,”279 would be enough to
satisfy FISA’s probable cause standard that the New Yorker may be
involved in activity that violates federal criminal law.280 But one or
two innocuous communications between the terrorist and the New
Yorker might not be enough to trigger targeting the future
communications of the New Yorker.281 Certainly, under a FISA-based
approach, one or two innocuous communications would not justify
electronic surveillance of other United States persons who are linked
or “chained” to the New Yorker or someone else mentioned in the
terrorist’s communications.282
278

Sims, supra note 32, at 126.
Id.
280
Cf. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 738 (explaining that FISA’s probable cause
standard encompasses conduct that “may involve” clandestine intelligence activity
because “these activities present the type of threats contemplated by the Supreme
Court in Keith”). According to the court, Keith “recognized that the focus of security
surveillance ‘may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of
crime’ even in the area of domestic threats to national security. Congress was aware of
Keith’s reasoning, and recognized that it applies a fortiori to foreign threats.” Id.
(citations omitted).
281
Sims, supra note 32, at 126 (stating that one or two apparently innocuous
communications between suspected terrorist and United States person “would
probably not be enough to secure issuance of a FISA warrant”).
282
Cf. Seymour M. Hersh, Listening In, NEW YORKER, May 29, 2006, at 24, 24
(explaining how NSA maps calls from overseas locations to the United States
triggering process known as “‘chaining,’ in which subsequent calls to and from the
American number were monitored and linked”). The process worked, according to
one high-level Bush Administration intelligence official, by taking “‘the first number
out to two, three, or more levels of separation, and see if one of them comes back’ —
if, say, someone down the chain was also calling the original, suspect number. As the
chain grew longer, more and more Americans inevitably were drawn in.” Id. Under
the chaining process, “tens of thousands of Americans had had their calls monitored
in one way or the other.” Id.; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 174 (describing how,
under TSP, officers at NSA began monitoring persons linked to al Qaeda figures,
279
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The Bush Administration is apparently (and understandably)
concerned that it obtains every communication coming from or
entering the United States that is relevant to potential terrorism. The
TSP “is based on the fear that some relevant communications may slip
through the cracks, in a situation in which the government either
cannot get a FISA warrant or is unwilling to do so.”283 But FISA bars
electronic surveillance targeting United States persons unless some
showing of clandestine intelligence activity or knowing planning for
terrorism is made. And that, according to one defender of the TSP and
former Bush Administration official, is “the real problem” with
FISA — it “depend[s] on individualized suspicion — that searches
and wiretaps must target a specific individual already believed to be
involved in criminal activity.”284 Under this view, rather than
complying with FISA, “searching for terrorists [should] depend on
playing the probabilities, just as with roadblocks and airport
screenings.”285 Or, as an exchange between Senator John Cornyn and
Attorney General Gonzales illustrated, the TSP attempts to address a
“gap” in FISA:
Isn’t it true that the problem that this program has tried to
address, the gap in FISA that it tries to address, is that, in
order to get a warrant under FISA, the Government must have
grounds to believe that the U.S. person it wishes to monitor is
a foreign spy or terrorist? And even if a person is here on a
student or tourist visa or no visa, the Government cannot get a
warrant to find out whether they are a terrorist. It must
already have reason to believe they are one . . . . The problem
with FISA as written is that the surveillance it authorizes is
unusable to discover who is a terrorist as distinct from
eavesdropping on known terrorists.286
The TSP addresses this so-called “gap” in FISA by monitoring
communications of United States persons to determine whether they

“creating an expanding chain”). “While most of the [telephone] numbers and [email]
addresses were overseas, hundreds were in the United States. . . . Since 2002, the
agency has been conducting some warrantless eavesdropping on people in the United
States who are linked, even if indirectly, to suspected terrorists through the chain of
phone numbers and e-mail addresses, according to several officials who know of the
operation.” Id.
283
Sims, supra note 32, at 127.
284
Yoo, supra note 24, at 582 (footnote omitted).
285
Id.
286
Wartime Executive Power, supra note 263, at 118-19.
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are working with or supporting terrorists. Put simply, the TSP
conducts suspicionless searches to identify potential terrorists or their
supporters within the nation’s borders. Such searches, if that is what
the TSP authorizes, not only conflict with FISA’s restrictions, but also
violate one of the few “absolutes in Fourth Amendment law”287 —
namely, suspicionless and warrantless electronic surveillance of
citizens’ telephone and email communications within the nation’s
borders is unreasonable.
Alternatively, the Bush Administration has argued that the searches
authorized by the TSP are consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s
special needs exception. To be sure, the Court’s special needs cases
have upheld suspicionless searches in a variety of settings and the
NSA’s ability to obtain foreign intelligence information is clearly a
special need under the Court’s precedents.288 The government insists
that “[t]here is no basis for concluding that the Constitution [under
the special needs exception] permits warrantless searches of high
school students’ lockers for drugs, but not warrantless searches of
international communications with the enemy.”289 Of course, the
objectionable feature of the TSP is not “warrantless searches of
international communications with the enemy.”290 As noted, the NSA
is free to monitor the overseas communications of al Qaeda members
without judicial approval. The constitutional objection against the
TSP is that it conducts warrantless (and apparently, suspicionless)
searches of the private communications of Americans within the
nation’s borders.
The Bush Administration is surely correct that gathering foreign
intelligence on terrorists and their supporters is an imperative
governmental interest. However, the flaw in the government’s special
needs argument is the conclusion that the special needs exception
allows warrantless searches whenever such searches promote
important governmental interests. From its inception, the special
needs exception has permitted suspicionless searches only where
circumstances make the warrant requirement impracticable. “[T]he
fact that FISA has been used successfully for almost thirty years

287
Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 681 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
288
Cf. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (noting that “where the risk to
public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the
risk may rank as ‘reasonable’ — for example, searches now routine at airports and at
entrances to courts and other official buildings”).
289
Brief of Appellants, supra note 24, at 37.
290
Id.
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demonstrates that a warrant and probable cause regime is not
impracticable for foreign intelligence surveillance.”291 Until the
government shows that FISA’s warrant process and watered-down
probable cause standards make foreign intelligence gathering
unworkable, the special needs exception cannot provide a
constitutional foundation to support the TSP.
CONCLUSION
Two centuries ago, the Fourth Amendment was thought to
guarantee that each citizen exercised sovereignty within his own home
and enjoyed freedom from governmental intrusion within that space,
unless the search or seizure was authorized by a specific warrant
issued by a neutral magistrate. For some, the modern War on Terror
requires a different balance when it comes to determining the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. The Bush Administration and those who
support the TSP believe that the President and Executive Branch
officials not only have the power to conduct warrantless electronic
searches for foreign intelligence, but also the authority to decide when
such surveillance is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Critics
of the President’s program contend that the TSP violates the Fourth
Amendment because it authorizes electronic surveillance of the
communications of American citizens within the United States
without prior judicial review.
In resolving this argument, it may be helpful to recall Justice
Souter’s observation when the Bush Administration made a similar
claim of Executive Branch authority to determine the liberty of an
American citizen: “In a government of separated powers, deciding
finally on what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in
peace or war (or some condition in between) is not well entrusted to
the Executive Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility
is to maintain security.”292 Under this view, the TSP violates the

291
Cole, supra note 33, at 36; see also Bloom & Dunn, supra note 191, at 197-98
(arguing that special needs exception does not apply to TSP “because a practical
warrant process exists to address the particular needs of this surveillance”). According
to Bloom and Dunn, “[t]he explicit FISA emergency exception suggests that no ‘special
needs’ exception would be applicable to electronic surveillance in nonconformance
with those limits. . . . [W]ith a practical and obtainable warrant process, the
justification for the surveillance based upon a ‘special needs’ exception would unduly
expand the doctrine past its judicially constructed limits and divorce it from the
exigency that supports dispensing with the traditional warrant requirement.” Id.
292
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment).
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Fourth Amendment and is inconsistent with the holding and spirit of
Keith, wherein Justice Powell noted:
The Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior judicial
judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may be
reasonably exercised. This judicial role accords with our basic
constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be
preserved through a separation of powers and division of
functions among the different branches and levels of
Government.293

293
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) (footnote
and citation omitted).

